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NOTE 
BEYOND WRONGFUL ADOPTION: 
EXPANDING ADOPTION AGENCY 
LIABILITY TO INCLUDE 
A DUTY TO INVESTIGATE 
AND A DUTY TO WARN 
As keepers of the conscience of the community, we cannot coun-
tenance conduct which would allow persons who desire entrance 
into the emotional realm of parenting to be unprotected from 
schemes or tactics designed to discharge societal burdens onto 
the unsuspecting or unwary. As trustees of the child's destiny 
the [adoption agencies are] obligated to act with morals greater 
than those found in a purveyor's common marketplace. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Jackson v. Montana,2 the Montana Supreme Court con-
sidered whether Montana law allowed adoptive parents to re-
cover for the tort of wrongful adoption and, if so, what duty it 
imposed upon adoption agencies. 3 Following the recent deci-
1. Michael J. v. L.A. County Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504, 513 (Cal. Ct. 
App.1988). 
2. 956 P.2d 35 (Mont. 1998). 
3. See id. at 42. 
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1
Emmaneel: Adoption Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
182 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:181 
sions of other jurisdictions, the Jackson court recognized the 
negligence-based tort of wrongful adoption in Montana, finding 
that both common law and Montana statutory law imposed a 
duty upon adoption agencies to accurately represent and dis-
close information regarding a child's background to adoptive 
parents. 4 First, the court held that forseeability and public 
policy interests imposed a common law duty upon adoption 
agencies to refrain from negligently misrepresenting a child's 
background to adoptive parents. 5 Second, the court found that 
adoption agencies had a statutory duty to disclose a child's 
background to adoptive parents.6 Finally, the court held that 
in order to recover for emotional and financial injuries, adop-
tive parents need only demonstrate that they would not have 
adopted the child had they known of his background. 7 
Part II of this note discusses the evolution of the tort of 
wrongful adoption. At fIrst, state courts would only allow 
adoptive parents to recover for wrongful adoption if they could 
prove that the adoption agency's conduct constituted fraud, a 
common law tort that requires the adoption agency's conduct to 
be intentional. 8 In time, public policy interests, such as the 
need for adoptive parents to be emotionally and financially 
prepared to raise a special needs child, persuaded state courts 
to allow adoptive parents to recover under the less stringent 
tort of negligence.9 As opposed to fraud, a showing of negli-
gence does not require that the adoption agency know its rep-
resentations are untrue, but merely requires that the adoption 
4. See id. at 48-49, 5l. 
5. See id. at 48-49. 
6. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 51. 
7. See id. at 52-53. For ease of reference, a masculine pronoun will be used to 
refer to an adopted child. The applicable pronoun will be used when referring to a 
specific child. 
8. See Michael J. v L.A. County Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1988); Reidy v. Albany County of Social Servs., 598 N.Y.S.2d 115 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1993); Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986). But see 
Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 165 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); 
MacMath v. Maine Adoption Placement Servs., 635 A.2d 359 (Me. 1993); Zernhelt v. 
Lehigh County Office of Children and Youth Servs., 659 A.2d 89 (Pa. Commw. Ct 
1995). 
9. See Roe v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese, 588 N .E.2d 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1992); M.H. v. Caritas Family SerVs., 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992); Gibbs v. Ernst, 
647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994); Meracle v. Children's Servo Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989). 
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agency's conduct in regard to the truth be unreasonable. 10 Part 
III discusses the facts underlying the decision in Jackson v. 
Montana. Part IV explains the procedural history of the case, 
including the District Court's opinion and the Jacksons' appeal 
to the Montana Supreme Court. Part V details the Montana 
Supreme Court's analysis and its focus on an adoption agency's 
common law duty to refrain from negligently misrepresenting a 
child's background to adoptive parents and its statutory duty to 
fully disclose information in its possession. Part VI criticizes 
the Montana Supreme Court for failing to read Montana's dis-
closure statute broadly and suggests that adoption agencies 
should be liable for failing to investigate a child's background 
and for failing to warn adoptive parents of any health risks 
stemming from the child's history. Imposition of such duties 
would ensure that adoptive parents are aware of the financial 
and emotional burdens likely to result from the adoption of a 
special needs child. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF WRONGFUL 
ADOPTION AS A CAUSE OF ACTION 
At common law, adoption agencies did not have a duty to 
disclose information regarding a child's familial and medical 
history and, as a consequence, were not held liable for their 
misrepresentations to potential adoptive parents. 11 The courts 
strictly enforced complete anonymity between adoptive and 
bIological parents, serving as a philosophical reminder that 
adoption was essentially a "rebirth" of an illegitimate child into 
a new family!2 However, within the last decade and a half, 
courts in many jurisdictions have condemned the historical 
code of silence followed by adoption agencies because of its im-
pact on adoptive parents who are unprepared or unable to care 
for a special needs child. 13 Instead, these courts have recog-
nized an adoptive parent's right to recover for injuries sus-
10. See Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 890 (Pa. 1994). 
11. See Susan G. James, Disclosure Or The Mental Health Or Biological Families 
In Adoptions, 34 U. LoUiSVILLEJ. FAM. L. 717, 731 (1996). 
12. See Laura W. Morgan, Telling The Truth In Adoption Proceedings: Tort 
Actions For Wrongful Adoption, 10 NO.1 DIVORCE LITIG. 11 (1998). 
13. See James, supra note 11, at 730·731. 
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tained due to an adoption agency's misrepresentations. 14 Ac-
cordingly, the historical "rebirth" rhetoric has been abandoned 
for a more conventional philosophy that promotes communica-
tion between an adoption agency and prospective adoptive par-
ents regarding a child's background. 15 This modem philosophy 
is based on the belief that it is essential for adoptive parents to 
know the medical and familial history of their adopted child in 
order to provide adequate care. 16 As a result, in recent years 
state courts have been bombarded with claims from adoptive 
parents asserting that their child's medical and familial back-
ground was not fully disclosed to them by the adoption 
agency. 17 
Traditionally, adoptive parents had two methods of legal 
redress: annulment of the adoption and state statutory reme-
dies. 18 Until wrongful adoption actions were recognized in Burr 
v. Board of County Commissioners 19 in 1986, annulment of the 
adoption was essentially an adoptive parent's only remedy. 20 
14. See id. 
15. See Morgan, supra note 12. 
16. See id. 
17. See Michael J. v. L.A. County Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1988); Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1980); Roe v. Catholic Charities ofthe Diocese, 588 N.E.2d 354 (Ill. 1992); M.H. v. 
Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992); Burr v. Board of County 
Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986); Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994). This 
Note's reference to adoption agencies is meant to include both public and private 
agencies. 
18. See Pat McDonald-Nunemaker, Wrongful Adoption: The Development Of A 
Better &medy In Tort, 12 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 391, 392-393 (1994). Annulment 
statutes allow courts to revoke the adoption decree and relieve the adoptive parents of 
any legal duty to the adopted child. Annulment proceedings can be invoked by the 
biological parents or the adoptive parents, though it is traditionally invoked by 
biological parents seeking to regain custody of their children. See Note, When Love Is 
Not Enough: Toward A Unified Wrongful Adoption Tort, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1761, 1765 
(1992). Courts have been wary to allow annulment proceedings in wrongful adoption 
cases because they are hesitant to subject children to abandonment twice in their 
young lives. See id. at 1766. "Between 1983 and 1987, sixty-nine adoptions in 
California were reportedly annulled because county agencies had fraudulently 
misrepresented a child's background or mental or physical health." Janet Hopkins 
Dickson, The Emerging Rights Of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 U.C.L.A. 
L. REV. 917, 946 (1991). 
19. See Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986). 
20. See County Dep't. of Pub. Welfare v. Morningstar, 151 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. App. 
1958). Adoptive parents brought action to annul an adoption based on the adoption 
agency's fraudulent misrepresentations that the child was in good health. The child 
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At first, state courts that confronted allegations of wrongful 
adoption "were leery of letting the genie too far out of the bot-
tle" by imposing too much liability upon adoption agencies. 21 
Thus, adoptive parents who could not fathom "returning" their 
child to an adoption agency, but who, nonetheless, needed as-
sistance with medical bills, had no remedy.22 
Recently, however, a growing number of states have begun 
to recognize a rather new form of legal redress for adoptive 
parents: the tort of wrongful adoption.'1:J A wrongful adoption 
cause of action allows adoptive parents to recover monetary 
damages for an adoption agency's intentional or negligent mis-
representations regarding a child's familial medical history and 
other pertinent information. 24 Adoptive parents may sue an 
adoption agency for wrongful adoption upon discovering, or 
upon the point at which they should have discovered, that the 
adoption agency misrepresented their child's background. 25 
Unlike its annulment and state statutory remedy counterparts, 
wrongful adoption allows courts to award compensatory and 
subsequently suffered from mental retardation, violent tantrums, and engaged in 
"serious sex abnormalities." The court granted the annulment because the adoption 
agency misrepresented that the biological father committed incest with the child. [d. 
at 151·152. 
21. John Gibeaut, Disclosing Birth Secrets, A.B.A. J., July 1998, at 35. 
22. See Dickson, supra note 18, at 956. 
23. As of this writing, states that recognize wrongful adoption include California 
(see Michael J. v. L.A. County Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1988»; Illinois (see Roe v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese, 588 N.E.2d 354 (Ill. 1992»; 
Massachusetts (see Mohr v. Commonwealth, 653 N.E.2d 1104 (Mass. 1995»; Minnesota 
(see M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992»; Montana (see 
Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d 35 (Mont. 1998»; New York (see Juman v. Louise Wise 
Servs., 608 N.Y.S.2d 612 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994), affd, 211 N.Y.S.2d 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1995»; Ohio (see Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986»; 
Pennsylvania (see Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994»; Rhode Island (see Mallette 
v. Children's Friend and Servs., 661 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1995»; Washington (see McKinney v. 
State, 950 P.2d 461 (Wash. 1998»; West Virginia (see Wolford v. Children's Home 
Soc'y, 17 F.Supp. 2d 577 (S.D. W.Va. 1998»; and Wisconsin (see Meracle v. Children's 
Servo Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989». But see Maine (see MacMath v. Maine 
Adoption Placement Servs., 635 A.2d 359 (Me. 1993» and Mississippi (see Foster v. 
Bass, 575 So.2d 967 (Miss. 1990». 
24. See Gibeaut, supra note 21, at 34. 
25. See McDonald·Nunemaker, supra note 18, at 394. 
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punitive damages to adoptive parents and leaves the family 
unit intact.26 
The fIrst wrongful adoption actions were brought under 
fraud theories, which required adoptive parents to prove that 
the adoption agencies gave them false information and inten-
tionally deceived them. 27 Unfortunately, adoptive parents 
found fraud difficult to prove because the adoption agency's 
misrepresentations were not always intentional. 28 Instead, 
they began to bring actions based on negligence theories.29 Un-
der negligence-based wrongful adoption, adoption agencies may 
be held liable merely for failing to use reasonable care in their 
relations with adoptive parents.30 These cases were also prob-
lematic for adoptive parents because courts were hesitant to 
impbse unlimited liability on adoption agencies for assuring a 
child's future good health.31 Courts feared that allowing adop-
tive parents to prevail on negligence theories in wrongful adop-
tion cases would result in "judge-made lemon law for adopted 
kids, as well as endless suits taxing the resources of adoption 
agencies."32 It wasn't until the early 1990s that courts began to 
approve of the less stringent negligence standard as an alter-
native to fraud. 33 By this time, most states had already begun 
26. See id. 
27. See Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 862, 889 (Pa. 1994) (relying on W. PAGE KEETON, 
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 105 (5th ed. 1984)). To prove 
fraud, or intentional misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show the following elements: 
(1) a representation; (2) which is material to the transaction at hand; (3) made 
[d. 
falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or 
false; (4) with the intent of misleading another into relying on it; (5) justifiable 
reliance on the misrepresentation; and (6) the resulting injury was 
proximately caused by the reliance. 
28. See, e.g., Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care, 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1980); MacMath v. Maine Adoption Placement Servs., 635 A.2d 359 (Me. 1993). 
29. See Gibeaut, supra note 21, at 35. 
30. See Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 890. As opposed to fraud, in order to prove negligent 
misrepresentation, a plaintiff need only show that (1) the defendant misrepresented a 
material fact; (2) the defendant knew or should have known of the misrepresentation, 
or made the "misrepresentation without knowledge as to its truth or falsity"; (3) the 
defendant intended the plaintiff to rely on the misrepresentation; and (4) the plaintiff 
was injured as a result of his justifiable reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation. 
See id. (quoting KEETON, supra note 27, § 107, at 745-58). 
31. See Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 891. 
32. Gibeaut, supra note 21, at 35. 
33. See id. 
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to impose liability upon adoption agencies by enacting their 
own statutes mandating the disclosure of a child's family medi-
cal history to his prospective adoptive parents.34 By 1998, only 
a handful of jurisdictions allowed adoptive parents to sue on a 
negligence-based theory.35 The Montana Supreme Court joined 
these jurisdictions in Jackson v. Montana, agreeing with their 
public policy concerns and imposing negligence-based liability 
upon adoption agencies for wrongful adoption. 36 
A. WRONGFUL ADOPTION Is INTRODUCED As A FRAUD-
BASED TORT 
As previously noted, the fIrst wrongful adoption claims were 
brought under fraud theories.37 To prove that an adoption 
agency was fraudulent in its disclosures or representations re-
garding a child's background, adoptive parents had to show 
that: (1) the adoption agency made a material representation or 
disclosure regarding the child's medical or familial background; 
(2) the adoption agency made the representation or disclosure 
knowing it to be false or with recklessness as to its truth; (3) 
the adoption agency intended to mislead adoptive parents into 
relying on the representation or disclosure; (4) the adoptive 
parents justifiably relied on the representation or the disclo-
sure; and (5) the resulting damages were proximately caused 
by the adoptive parents' reliance on the adoption agency's rep-
resentation or disclosure. 36 
34. See id. As of this writing, all states have statutes mandating or permitting 
adoption agencies to disclose some medical information to adoptive parents. For a list 
of current disclosure statutes, see Morgan, supra note 12, at 12·13. 
35. See Gibeaut, supra note 21, at 34. By the time Jackson reached the Montana 
Supreme Court, states that recognized negligence·based wrongful adoption included 
Illinois (see Roe v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese, 588 N.E.2d 1101 (Ill. 1992»; 
Massachusetts (see Mohr v. Commw., 653 N.E.2d 1104 (Mass. 1995»; Minnesota (see 
M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992»; Pennsylvania (see Gibbs 
v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994»; Rhode Island (see Mallette v. Children's Friend & 
Serv., 661 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1995»; and Wisconsin (see Meracle v. Children's Servo Soc'y, 
437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989». 
36. See Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d 35, 47 (Mont. 1998). 
37. See Michael J. v. L.A. County Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1988); Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Servs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1980); Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986). 
38. See Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 889. 
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In 1986, the Ohio Supreme Court became the fIrst state to 
recognize the fraud-based tort of wrongful adoption in Burr v. 
Board of County Commissioners. 39 In Burr, the adoptive par-
ents accused an adoption agency of fraudulently misrepre-
senting facts concerning the family medical history of their 
adopted son, Patrick.40 At the time of Patrick's adoption in 
1964, welfare officials told the Burrs that Patrick was a 
healthy baby born to an unwed mother who had surrendered 
him to the state for adoption.41 Years later, Patrick began to 
suffer from psychological and learning disabilities. 42 By high 
school, Patrick was experiencing hallucinations and was diag-
nosed with Huntington's Disease, a fatal genetic disease that 
attacks the central nervous system. 43 After obtaining a court 
order to open Patrick's pre-adoption background fIles, the 
Burrs learned that Patrick's mother was a mental patient with 
psychotic tendencies and that his father was unknown, al-
though presumed to have been a mental patient as well. 44 Pat-
rick's history placed him at risk for mental illness. 45 The adop-
tion agency did not reveal this information to the Burrs at any 
time subsequent to its representation that Patrick was 
healthy.46 
In its discussion, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that 
the adoption agency made material misrepresentations re-
garding Patrick's medical background with the intention of 
misleading the Burrs into relying on the information in their 
decision to adopt.47 As a result of their justifIable reliance on 
the adoption agency's misrepresentations, the Burrs suffered 
damages that they would not have otherwise incurred had the 
39. 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986). 
40. See id. at 1104. 
41. See id. at 1103. 
42. See id. 
43. See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1103. 
44. See id. at 1104. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. The court did not indicate whether the Burrs inquired about Patrick's 
health at the time of adoption or whether the adoption agency volunteered the 
information. However, the court did acknowledge that the agency knew its statements 
to the Burrs regarding Patrick's health were false and that the agency had in its 
possession Patrick's sealed medical records. See id. at 1105-1106. 
47. See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1106. 
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adoption agency fully disclosed Patrick's background. 48 In con-
cluding that the adoption agency's misrepresentations consti-
tuted fraud, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that "it would be a 
travesty of justice and distortion of truth to conclude that de-
ceitful placement of this infant, known by appellants to be at 
risk, was not actionable when the tragic but hidden realities of 
the child's infIrmities came to light."49 However, the court em-
phasized that its decision addressed the "deh1>erate act of mis-
informing" the adoptive parents and not merely the agency's 
negligent "failure to disclose" Patrick's background. 50 There-
fore, despite its explicit recognition of fraud-based wrongful 
adoption, the Ohio Supreme Court remained hesitant to extend 
an adoption agency's liability into the realm of negligence. 51 
Recognition of fraud-based wrongful adoption, however, fInally 
provided a monetary remedy to adoptive parents. 52 
After Burr, courts began to address the public policy con-
cerns as well as the legal implications of wrongful adoption. 
48. See id. The court assessed the damages as being ·Patrick's medical expenses 
(in excess of $80,000 for the Huntington's Disease treatment alone), together with 
other damages." [d. at 1104. 
[d. 
49. [d. at 1107. 
50. [d. at 1109. The full excerpt reads: 
In no way do we imply that adoption agencies are guarantors of their 
placements. Such a view would be tantamount to imposing an untenable 
contract of insurance that each adopted child would mature to be healthy and 
happy. Such matters are solely in the hands of a higher authority. Adoptive 
parents are in the same position as, and confront risks comparable to those, of 
natural parents relative to their child's future. Our decision should not be 
viewed as altering traditional family relationships and responsibilities, nor 
should it be read as shifting part of the burden of parenting to society. 
However, just as couples must weigh the risks of becoming natural parents, 
taking into consideration a host of factors, so too should adoptive parents be 
allowed to make their decision in an intelligent manner. It is not the mere 
failure to disclose the risks inherent in this child's background which we hold 
actionable. Rather, it is the deliberate act of misinforming this couple which 
deprived them oftheir right to make a sound parenting decision and which led 
to the compensable injuries. 
51. See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109. The adoption agency also claimed that it was 
immune from this action since the Burrs were covered by a state statutory remedy that 
would allow them to receive a subsidy for adopting a special needs child. However, the 
court denied the adoption agency's argument, holding that the statute applied only to 
"the knowing placement" of special needs children where both the adoption agency and 
thll prospective adoptive parents have agreed to subsidy arrangements before the 
finalization ofthe adoption. [d. at 1108-1109. 
52. See Gibeaut, supra note 21, at 34. 
9
Emmaneel: Adoption Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
190 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 29:181 
The California Court of Appeal was faced with a fraud-based 
wrongful adoption case in Michael J. v. Los Angeles County De-
partment of Adoptions. 53 There, an adoptive mother and her 
son sued for negligence and fraud, alleging that the adoption 
agency misrepresented the son's health. 54 The adoption agency 
failed to disclose that the child's physician at the time of adop-
tion "refused to make a prognosis on the child's health" due to a 
port wine stain on his face and torso. 55 The child was eventu-
ally diagnosed with epilepsy and Sturge-Weber Syndrome, a 
genetic degenerative nerve disorder present at birth. 56 The 
trial court granted the adoption agency's motion for summary 
judgment, holding that it was immune from liability. 57 The 
adoptive parents appealed.68 
The Court of Appeal addressed whether the adoption agency 
fraudulently failed to disclose material facts that were within 
the adoption agency's possession at the time of the child's adop-
tion.59 Relying on dicta in Burr, the court conceeded that an 
adoption agency cannot be deemed the guarantor of a child's 
future good health and should not be held liable for negligence 
in providing such information.so The court reasoned, however, 
that the adoption agency's failure to disclose the doctor's re-
fusal to diagnose the child and the its representation that the 
port wine stain was merely a birthmark were material facts 
that should have been disclosed to the adoptive parents during 
53. 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
54. See id. at 505. 
55. [d. The court did not indicate why the physician refused to make a prognosis. 
56. See id. at 506. Sturge-Weber Syndrome is identified by an angioma, "a knot 
of distended blood vessels overlaying and compressing the surface of the brain." THE 
BANTAM MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 20 (1982). It may cause conditions such as epilepsy 
and hemorrhaging and is often associated with a purple birthmark on the face. See id. 
Here, Michael was diagnosed as having a port wine stain on his upper torso and face 
since birth. See Mich.crel J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 505. Based on medical information 
known at the time, the adoption agency's doctors should have known that the port wine 
stain was a manifestation of this disease. See id. 
57. Michael J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 506. 
58. See id. 
59. See id. at 511. Eight years earlier, the California Court of Appeal had refused 
to recognize a fraud-based wrongful adoption cause of action. See Richard P. v. Vista 
Del Mar Child Care Servs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
60. See id. at 512-513. 
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the adoption procesS.61 Had the adoptive parents known of 
these facts before the finalization of the adoption, they would 
have been effectively put on notice of the significance of the 
doctor's refusal to diagnose the child and, thus, would have 
been given an opportunity to conduct an independent back-
ground investigation.62 The court held that the non-disclosure 
of such significant facts constituted fraud, and concluded that 
an adoption agency must fully disclose, in good faith, material 
facts regarding the existing and past medical conditions of the 
children it places.63 The court further noted that public policy 
cannot tolerate such blatant concealment or intentional mis-
representations by adoption agencies. 54 As a result, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal held that the lower court erred in 
granting the adoption agency's motion for summary judgment 
since the adoption agency's deliberate misrepresentations were 
actionable as fraud. 65 Accordingly, the court allowed fraud as a 
basis for wrongful adoption. 65 
B. THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS NEGLIGENCE-BASED ACTIONS 
Despite the success of some adoptive parents under fraud-
based theories, others found that they could only prevail in 
cases that clearly involved intentional misconduct on the part 
[d. 
61. See Michael J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 513. 
62. See id. 
63. See id. 
64. See id. The court stated: 
Public policy cannot extend to condone concealment or intentional 
misrepresentation which misleads prospective adoptive parents about the 
unusual calamity they are assuming. The adoption of a child is an act of 
compassion, love, humanitarian concern where the adoptive parent voluntarily 
assumes enormous legal, moral, social and fInancial obligations. Accordingly, 
a trustworthy process benefIts society, as well as the child and parent. As 
keepers of the conscience of the community, we cannot countenance conduct 
which would allow persons who desire entrance into the emotional realm of 
parenting to be unprotected from schemes or tactics designed to discharge 
societal burdens onto the unsuspecting or unwary. As trustees of the child's 
destiny the agency was obligated to act with morals greater than those found 
in a purveyor's common marketplace. 
65. See Michael J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 513. 
66. See id. See also Reidy v. Albany County Dep't of Social Servs., 598 N.y.s.2d 
115, 116 (N .Y. App. Div. 1993) (Adoption agency misrepresented that a child was 
sexually abused. The New York Supreme Court recognized fraud as a basis for 
wrongful adoption). 
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of the adoption agency.67 As a result, courts began to acknowl-
edge that public policy interests favored disclosure to adoptive 
parents. Slowly, courts recognized adoptive parents' negli-
gence- based claims as acceptable standards under which to 
hold adoption agencies liable.68 As opposed to fraud, which re-
quires the adoptive parents to prove an intentional misrepre-
sentation or omission, negligence requires that adoptive par-
ents show: (1) the adoption agency had a duty to the adoptive 
parents to accurately represent or disclose information re-
garding the child's background; (2) the adoption agency 
breached that duty; (3) the adoption agency's breach caused the 
adoptive parents to be injured; and (4) the adoptive parents 
sustained damages.69 Thus, negligence-based wrongful adop-
tion claims did not have to rise to the level of intentional fraud 
in order to provide adoptive parents a basis for recovery. 70 
In 1992, in Roe v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of 
Springfield,71 the Illinois Appellate Court specifically ad-
dressed the issue of whether a common law cause of action 
such as negligent wrongful adoption was permissible when no 
adoption statute explicitly provided for it. 72 Since adoption is 
an area traditionally controlled by state statutory law, the 
court was concerned that the statutes might not allow such an 
extension. 73 Specifically, the court was concerned that adoption 
agencies, being bound by statutory law, could not also be bound 
by common law principles. 74 
67. See, e.g., Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Servs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980). See also MacMath v. Maine Adoption Placement Servs., 635 A.2d 
359 (Me. 1993). 
68. See e.g., Meracle v. Children's Servo Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989); M.H. v. 
Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992). 
69. See Jackson, 956 P.2d 35 at 42. These elements are applicable in any 
negligence action. See KEETON, supra note 27, § 30, at 164·65. 
70. See Thanda A. Fields, Declaring a Policy of Truth: Recognizing The Wrongful 
Adoption Claim, 37 B.C. L. REV. 975, 1005 (1996). 
71. 588 N.E.2d 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). 
72. See id. at 357. 
73. See id. 
74. See id. at 359·360. 
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In Roe, three sets of parents sought to adopt children. 75 
Each set of parents specifically stated that they would only 
consider a physically and mentally healthy child and each re-
quested that the adoption agency provide any iniOrmation 
available regarding the child's background. 76 The adoption 
agency informed each set of parents that the children were 
healthy, but claimed that it did not possess any background 
information on the children. 77 In reality, the adoption agency 
knew that each of the three children had engaged in uncon-
trollable and disruptive behavior. 78 Each of the adoptive par-
ents relied on the adoption agency's representations in their 
decisions to adopt the children. 79 Furthermore, each child con-
tinued to exhibit violent behavior after the adoptions were 
complete.80 The adoptive parents filed a lawsuit against the 
adoption agency for fraudulent and negligent misrepresenta-
tion for failing to disclose the children's psychological and 
medical information.81 The circuit court granted the adoption 
agency's motion to dismiss and the adoptive parents appealed. 82 
The court of appeal began its analysis by briefly addressing 
whether Illinois recognized a cause of action for fraud-based 
wrongful adoption. 83 Following previous fraud cases such as 
Burr and Michael J., the court concluded that recognition of 
fraud-based wrongful adoption was merely an extension of 
75. See Roe, 588 N.E.2d at 356. 
76. See id. 
77. See id. 
78. See id. Specifically, the adoption agency knew that Jane Roe had seen several 
psychiatrists for "violent and uncontrollable behavior as well as intellectual, social and 
emotional retardation," Billy Doe exhibited "abnormal behavior such as smearing feces 
on the interior walls of past foster homes" and other uncontrollable behavior, and Joe 
Boe "displayed destructive behavior in past foster homes such as stomping the family's 
dog to death" and suffered from "emotional and social retardation." Id. 
79. See Roe, 588 N.E.2d at 356. 
80. See id. The court noted that since being placed with their adoptive parents, 
·one child cut the whiskers off the family cat and flattened the mother's tires. Another 
child painted a neighbor's house and exposed himself to neighbors. The other child had 
severe episodes of violent behavior requiring the aid of professional counseling ... Joe 
Boe was institutionalized." Id. 
81. See id. at 356. 
82. See id. at 357. The court did not indicate what the adoption agency alleged in 
its motion to dismiss or what the Circuit Court concluded in its decision to grant the 
motion. 
83. See Roe, 588 N.E.2d at 357. 
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common law fraud into the realm of adoption law.84 To avoid 
liability, adoption agencies only need to follow the law.85 The 
court reasoned that since statutorily created laws such as cor-
porations are bound by common law principles as well as statu-
tory principles, it would be reasonable to conclude that adop-
tion agencies would also be bound by both common law and 
statutory principles.86 Since the extension of common law 
fraud in the adoption context was already recognized in other 
states, the court concluded that recognition of common law 
negligence for wrongful adoption would not be a radical depar-
ture from common law principles.87 Rather, it would merely be 
an extension of common law fraud. 88 Thus, the court concluded 
that an adoption agency could be liable for both fraud and neg-
ligence.89 
After fmding that common law causes of action for fraud 
and negligence applied to statutorily governed adoptions, the 
court addressed whether the adoption agency breached its duty 
to the adoptive parents by failing to disclose information to 
them.90 The court held that the duty owed in all misrepresen-
tation cases, whether negligent or fraudulent, is the same since 
an adoption agency can be liable for failing to provide adequate 
information as well as for providing false information. 91 Here, 
the adoption agency had a duty to provide honest and complete 
responses to the adoptive parents' requests for background in-
formation on the children. 92 When the adoption agency failed 
to give the adoptive parents the information that it had avail-
able, it breached this duty.93 Further, the adoption agency 
could reasonably have foreseen the unfortunate consequences 
of placing these mentally ill children with parents who were 
84. See id. 
85. See id. at 360. 
86. See id. at 359. 
87. See Roe, 588 N.E.2d at 357. 
88. See id. 
89. Sep. id. at 357, 366. 
90. See id. at 36l. 
91. See Roe, 588 N.E.2d at 36l. 
92. See id. at 365. 
93. See id. 
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unaware of any problems.94 Accordingly, the court reversed the 
lower court's dismissal, rmding that the adoptive parents had 
stated claims for both fraudulent and negligent misrepresenta-
tion.95 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota also addressed the issue of 
negligent misrepresentation in the adoption setting in M.B. v. 
Caritas Family Services.96 There, the adoption agency claimed 
that the plaintiffs appeared to be willing to adopt any child 
that was not seriously mentally ill.97 The adoption agency pro-
vided the plaintiffs with background information that indicated 
the child's biological family was generally healthy.98 However, 
the adoption agency mentioned on several occasions that there 
was a possibility of incest in the child's family.99 After the child 
was placed with the plaintiffs, he began to exhibit jumpy and 
nervous behavior.loo At the request of the child's psychologist, 
the adoption agency sent the adoptive parents information 
about the child's genetic background. 101 This information indi-
cated that the adoption agency knew from the beginning that 
the child's biological parents were a 17 -year old boy with men-
tal health history, and his 13-year old sister.l02 
The plaintiffs alleged that the adoption agency negligently 
misrepresented the child's familial background by failing to 
fully and accurately disclose what it knew. 103 The adoption 
agency moved for summary judgment on public policy grounds, 
claiming that recognition of common law negligent misrepre-
94. See id. In noting that the burden should be placed on the adoption agency 
since it has the information, the court said that "the consequences of placing that 
burden on defendant is defendant discloses what information it has in response to an 
adopting parent's inquiry, so that adoptive parents assume the awesome responsibility 
of raising a child with their eyes wide open." [d. 
95. See Roe, 588 N.E.2d at 366. The court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of 
the adoptive parents' breach of contract claim since their allegations and the relief 
prayed for sounded in tort rather than contract law. See id. 
96. 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992). 
97. See id. at 284. 
98. See id. at 285. 
99. See id. 
100. See Caritas, 488 N.W.2d at 285. 
101. See id. 
102. See id. 
103. See id. at 286. 
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sentation would place an unreasonable burden on adoption 
agencies by requiring them to confIrm every child's familial 
backgroWld.104 The adoption agency further claimed that impo-
sition of such liability upon adoption agencies would inevitably 
discourage adoptions of hard-to-place and special needs chil-
dren.l05 The lower court denied the adoption agency's motion. 106 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota addressed 
whether public policy precluded them from holding an adoption 
agency liable for negligently misrepresenting a child's medical 
and familial backgroWld.107 The court acknowledged the adop-
tion agency's concerns, but recognized the compelling need for 
adoptive parents to be informed of background information 
known to the adoption agency in order to obtain adequate care 
for the child and to make personal family decisions. lOS The 
court held that imposition of a duty upon adoption agencies 
only requires that they exercise due care in disclosing a child's 
history fully and adequately to avoid misleading potential 
adoptive parents. 109 
Here, the adoption agency was aware from the beginning 
that the child's biological parents were siblings. 110 The court 
concluded that once the adoption agency disclosed the possibil-
ity of incest to the adoptive parents, it assumed a duty to en-
sure that the disclosure was complete and adequate. 111 Thus, 
after finding that public policy did not preclude them from 
holding an adoption agency liable for negligent misrepresenta-
tion, the court found that the adoption agency was liable for 
wrongful adoption in negligently misrepresenting the child's 
background. 112 
104. See Caritas, 488 N.w.2d at 286. 
105. See id. at 287. 
106. See id. at 288. 
107. See id. 
108. See Caritas, 488 N.W.2d at 287. 
109. See id. at 288. 
110. See id. at 287. 
111. See id. at 288. 
112. See Caritas, 488 N.w .2d at 288. The court denied the H's intentional 
misrepresentation claim since there was no evidence that the adoption agency intended 
to mislead the H's by withholding background information. See id. at 289. 
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also addressed the issue 
of a negligence standard in the adoption arena in Gibbs v. 
Ernst. 113 When the Gibbses sought to adopt, they indicated 
that they would adopt a child who was hard to place due to age, 
but specifically requested a child that had not been exposed to 
physical or sexual abuse.ll4 The adoption agency placed 5 year-
old Michael with the Gibbses, disclosing that he was hyperac-
tive, behind in school, and had been verbally abused by his 
biological mother. lUi After the fmalization of the adoption, the 
adoption agency assured the Gibbses that it disclosed all the 
information it had regarding Michaefs background. 116 Imme-
diately after the adoption, Michael began to exhibit violent be-
havior towards other children.ll7 Once it became evident that 
Michaefs behavior would not change, he was placed in the cus-
tody of the Department of Ruman Services (DRS). 118 Shortly 
thereafter, the Gibbses learned from a DRS caseworker that 
Michael had been severely sexually and physically abused by 
his biological mother, had a history of violence towards chil-
dren, and had been in ten foster homes before being placed 
with the Gibbses. 119 The Gibbses sued the adoption agency for 
fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation and for negligent 
non-disclosure. l20 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court fIrst addressed whether 
Pennsylvania should extend the common law torts of fraud and 
negligence to the adoption setting. 121 The court focused on the 
competing interests of adoption agencies and adoptive par-
ents. l22 It recognized the prospective parents' interest in 
113. 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994). 
114. See id. at 884. 
115. See id. at 884-885. 
116. See id. at 885. 
117. See Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 885. The court indicated that Michael "attempt[ed) to 
amputate the arm of a five year old; attempt[ed) to suffocate his younger cousin; 
attempt[ed) to kill another cousin by hitting him over the head with a lead pipe; 
deliberately plac[ed) Clorox in a cleaning solution causing Ms. Gibbs to burn her hands 
badly; and startled) a fire which seriously injured a younger cousin." [d. 
118. See id. 
119. See id. at 885-886. The court noted that at one point, Michael's biological 
mother "attempted to cut off his penis." [d. 
120. See id. at 886. 
121. See Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 886. 
122. See id. 
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knowing as much as possible about the health and familial his-
tory of the child they want to adopt.l23 The court also balanced 
the parents' interests against the interests of the adoption 
agencies. 124 It recognized that adoption agencies might face a 
reduction in successful adoptions if courts placed too much li-
ability upon them. l25 However, the court concluded that re-
gardless of the adoption agency's concerns, the traditional 
common law causes of action for both fraud and negligence ap-
ply to adoptions despite the statutory nature of adoption pro-
ceedings.126 The court explicitly held that under a fraud theory, 
the adoption agency had an "obligation to refrain from fraudu-
lent and deceitful tactics."127 
Further, the court held the cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation applicable as well, expanding an adoption 
agency's liability for negligence to "those conditions reasonably 
predictable at the time of placement. "128 The court reasoned 
that the increased burden on adoption agencies under causes of 
action for negligence was mitigated by the requirement that 
adoption agency efforts only be reasonable. l29 Additionally, the 
adoption agency may simply avoid making any representations 
at all if the burden seems overwhelming. l30 Thus, the court 
held that the Gibbses had a cause of action against the adop-
123. See id. at 886-887. 
124. See id. 
125. See Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 887. 
126. See id. 
127. [d. at 890. The court stated: 
[d. 
We require no less from every other business or non-profit organization in this 
Commonwealth, and see no valid reason to release adoption intermediaries 
from the burden of truth in their daily operations. Indeed, we fmd it 
particularly apposite in this context because of the potentially devastating 
consequences that can result from fraudulent conduct here. 
128. [d. at 891. The court stated it would 
[d. 
in no way imply that adoption agencies are insurers or warrantors of a child's 
health. The tort we now recognize is not similar to, nor can it be compared 
with products liability or contractual warranties. Adoption agencies must 
merely use reasonable care to insure that the information they communicate is 
accurate. 
129. See Gibbs. 647 A.2d at 891. 
130. See id. 
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tion agency for both fraudulent and negligent misrepresenta-
tion of Michael's background. 131 
Once it seemed evident that courts were willing to allow 
both fraud-based and negligence-based wrongful adoption 
claims, adoptive parents who could not prove fraud began to 
sue solely for negligence. One such ,case was Mallette v. Chil-
dren's Friend & Service. 132 In Mallette, the adoption agency 
told the Mallettes that Christopher's biological mother suffered 
from learning disabilities caused by head trauma she sustained 
as a child. l33 Several years after the adoption, the Mallettes 
learned that the adoption agency had a report on fIle regarding 
Christopher's medical and familial background, which con-
fumed that his biological mother was moderately retarded. 134 
The report acknowledged the possibility that head trauma 
caused the mother's mental retardation, but indicated that 
there were no medical records to support such a conclusion. 135 
By the time Christopher was thirteen years old, he was diag-
nosed as mentally retarded and severely disturbed. l36 The 
Mallettes sued the adoption agency for negligently misrepre-
senting and omitting important information regarding Christo-
pher's background. 137 The Superior Court denied the adoption 
agency's motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a 
131. See id. at 892. The court also held that the Gibbses stated a cause of action for 
negligent non-disclosure since the unique relationship between the adoption agency 
and the adoptive parents imposed a duty upon the adoption agency to fully disclose all 
relevant non-identifYing information regarding a child's background. See id. at 893. 
The court refused to recognize that an adoption agency had an affirmative duty to 
investigate a child's background since such a duty would place an undue burden on 
adoption agencies that had yet to be recognized by any other state, See id. at 894. See 
also Zemhelt v. Lehigh County Office of Children & Youth Servs., 659 A.2d 89, 90-91 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (adoption agency was not liable for its intentional 
misrepresentations to adoptive parents because Pennsylvania law prohibits local 
agencies from being held liable for fraud). 
132. 661 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1992). 
133. See id. at 68. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. The Mallettes also learned that the child's biological mother was 
diagnosed with macroephaly, pseudoepicanthal folds, a high arched palate, 
tachycardia, hand tremors, and poor coordination. See id. 
136. See Mallette, 661 A.2d at 68. 
137. See id. 
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claim. l38 The adoption agency appealed to the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court. 139 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court fIrst addressed whether 
Rhode Island should recognize claims against adoption agen-
cies for negligent misrepresentations made to adoptive par-
ents. 140 Relying on Gibbs and Caritas, the court concluded that 
an adoption agency may be held liable for its negligent misrep-
resentations to adoptive parents. 141 The court held that once 
the adoption agency began to volunteer information to the 
Mallettes, it assumed a duty to refrain from negligently mis-
representing information regarding Christopher's back-
ground. 142 By misinforming the Mallettes of Christopher's fa-
milial history, the adoption agency breached its duty.l43 Fur-
ther, since the Mallettes relied on the adoption agency's mis-
representations, they were denied the opportunity to adopt a 
child that would not require special care. 144 Accordingly, the 
court held that the Mallettes had a viable claim for negligent 
misrepresentation. 145 
The court further addressed whether public policy interests 
precluded recognition of negligence-based wrongful adoption. 146 
The court agreed with the decisions in Gibbs and Caritas that 
recognition of such a cause of action would promote public pol-
icy without making adoption agencies the guarantors of a 
child's future good health.147 The court held that an adoption 
agency could either avoid making representations at all or 
could simply represent a child's background non-negligently. 148 
Moreover, the court held that an adoption agency's duty to 
adoptive parents would only apply to conditions that were fore-
138. See id. 
139. See id. at 69. 
140. See Mallette, 661 A.2d at 70. 
141. See id. at 70-71. 
142. See id. at 71. 
143. See id. 
144. See Mallette, 661 A.2d at 71. 
145. See id. 
146. See id. at 72. 
147. See id. at 72-73. 
148. See Mallette, 661 A.2d at 73. 
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seeable at the time the adoption took place. 149 Thus, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court denied the adoption agency's appeal and 
remanded the case to the Superior Court, fmding that the 
Mallettes stated a cause of action for negligent misrepresenta-
tion.l50 
Following this line of cases, recent court decisions have used 
wrongful adoption policy concerns to impose negligence liability 
for failing to comply with state disclosure statutes. Not long 
before the Montana Supreme Court addressed the issue in 
Jackson, the Washington Supreme Court in McKinney v. Wash-
ington 151 held that an adoption agency can be held liable for 
negligence-based wrongful adoption for negligently failing to 
comply with mandatory disclosure laws. In 1988, the McKin-
neys applied to adopt Abby despite learning from a caseworker 
of the possibility that Abby was born with Fetal Alcohol Syn-
drome (F AS), was sexually abused, and/or was mentally re-
tarded. 152 The McKinneys applied for public subsidies provided 
to those who adopt special needs children. l53 In 1992, two years 
after the adoption was fmalized, the McKinneys received the 
adoption agency's records which indicated that the agency 
knew as early as 1984 that Abby's problems might have been 
149. See id. 
150. See id. The court noted that: 
We are of the opinion that an adoption system based on fairness and fuller 
disclosure of nonidentifying information concerning the child remains the 
ideal. We believe our decision moves us a small step closer to such an 
aspiration. If the adoption agency undertakes to make representations to 
adopting parents, fairness dictates that they do so in a nonnegligent manner. 
Conversely, if the adoption agency remains silent in the face of adopting 
parents' inquiries, the parents will at least be alerted that any decision to 
adopt should be made ever more cautiously. We note that the need for 
accurate disclosure becomes more acute when special-needs children are 
involved ... we believe extending the tort of negligent Imislrepresentation to 
the adoption context will help alleviate some of the artificial uncertainty 
imposed on a situation inherent with uncertainty. 
[d. 
151. 950 P.2d 461, 465 (Wash. 1998). 
152. See id. at 463. The McKinneys were friends with Abby's foster parents and 
babysat her on weekends for about a year. At the time that they applied to adopt her, 
the McKinneys knew that Abby had 20 to 30 temper tantrums per day, did not talk or 
play with other children, was lethargic, was in special education programs and 
counseling, was removed from her biological mother because of neglect and possible 
sexual abuse, lived in several foster homes, and was developmentally delayed. See id. 
153. See id. 
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caused by her biological mother's alcohol abuse and that Abby 
was thought to have Down's Syndrome. l54 After Abby was offi-
cially diagnosed with F AS in 1993, the McKinneys fIled a com-
plaint against the adoption agency, claiming that, had they 
accurately known Abby's full history, they would not have 
adopted her. l55 The court addressed whether adoptive parents 
could sue an adoption agency for failing to disclose a child's 
familial history. 156 
Using Washington's disclosure statute as a guide, the court 
reasoned that despite the statutory obligation of adoption 
agencies to disclose certain information to potential adoptive 
parents, public policy also requires such a duty. 157 The unique 
relationship between adoptive parents and the adoption agency 
created a duty to disclose even if the statute did not provide for 
it.l58 The court agreed with the policy considerations discussed 
by other state courts and concluded that the adoption agency 
was only required to make reasonable efforts to disclose infor-
mation within its possession. 159 As a result, the court found 
that the adoption agency had a duty to disclose what it knew of 
Abby's background once the McKinney's became prospective 
adoptive parents. l60 However, the court further held that even 
though the adoption agency may have breached this duty, its 
breach was not the proximate cause of the McKinneys' injury 
since the agency's disclosure would have only confIrmed what 
the McKinneys already knew about Abby's history. 161 Thus, 
although the McKinney's could not recover, the court concluded 
that an adoption agency's negligent failure to comply with the 
state disclosure statute and public policy concerns in disclosing 
a child's background information may result in liability if the 
adoption agency failed to use reasonable efforts. 162 The next 
154. See id. at 464. 
155. See McKinney, 950 P.2d at 464. 
156. See id. 
157. See id. at 466. 
158. See id. 
159. See McKinney, 950 P.2d at 467468. 
160. See id. at 468. 
161. Seeid.at471. 
162. See id. at 465. The court also decided that an adoption agency's duty to 
disclose attaches once a person interested in adopting a child reaches the "prospective 
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court to address negligence-based wrongful adoption was the 
, Montana Supreme Court in Jackson v. Montana. 
III. FACTS OF JACKSON v. MONTANA 
Eugene and Peggy Jackson adopted Aaron in 1986.163 After 
Aaron began to show severe behavioral and psychological 
problems, the Jacksons learned that, at the time of the adop-
tion, state social workers withheld psychological reports on 
Aaron's biological mother and the state adoption agency lied 
about Aaron's biological background.l64 The Jacksons sued the 
state adoption agency in Montana state court for negligently 
misrepresenting and negligently failing to disclose Aaron's 
medical and familial background. 165 
A THE BIOLOGICAL PARENTS 
Deborah Annette Russell (hereinafter "Russell") gave birth 
to John Allen Russell, who was renamed Aaron Jon Jackson 
(hereinafter "Aaron") by his adoptive parents, on November 8, 
1983.166 Russell spent most of her pregnancy incarcerated in 
Montana. 167 During her pregnancy, psychological evaluations 
conducted by clinical psychologists characterized her as "emo-
tionally immature and inappropriate," as "making marginal 
psychological adjustments," and as "disorganized, unconven-
tional, diffused, [and, at times], delusional."l68 She was even-
tually diagnosed with "borderline intellectual functioning and 
inadequate personality. "169 
In 1983, Robert Stevens, one of Aaron's possible biological 
fathers, was treated as an inpatient at the Veterans Admini-
adoptive parent status." Id. Here, the McKinneys became prospective adoptive 
parents when the adoption agency approved the McKinneys' request for subsidies, 
thereby formally recognizing the McKinneys' eligibility to adopt Abby. See id. at 468. 
163. See Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d 35, 40 (Mont. 1998). 
164. See id. at 40-4l. 
165. See id. at 4l. 
166. See id. at 39. 
167. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 39. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 40. 
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stration Medical Center in Wyoming. 170 His doctor diagnosed 
him with "schizophrenic disorder, paranoid type."171 The State 
obtained copies of these evaluations prior to placing Aaron for 
adoption. 172 
A year after Russell's evaluation was conducted, Aaron, 
then two months old, was hospitalized for aspiration after Rus-
sell fed him carbonated soda, meat, and vegetables. 173 The 
State then ordered that it provide child protective services to 
Russell and Aaron. 174 A state social worker noted that Russell 
had a low IQ and ''function[ed] as though she [was] retarded."175 
The social worker concluded that Russell was mentally dis-
turbed and in need of professional counseling. 176 In addition to 
the social worker's evaluation, the State arranged for a psy-
chologist to perform a psychological evaluation on Russell. 177 
The psychologist ultimately diagnosed Russell with "Paranoid 
Personality Disorder with mild mental retardation."178 
In August 1984, Dave Wallace, a social worker employed by 
the State, submitted a report to the court detailing Russell's 
psychological evaluations, studies, and reports. 179 In his report, 
Wallace suggested that, due to Russell's psychological prob-
lems, Aaron should be separated from her to ensure his physi-
cal and emotional well being. 180 Based on Wallace's report, the 
170. See id. at 39. 
171. Jackson, 956 P.2d at 39. No other information regarding Aaron's two possible 
fathers is given in the court's opinion. 
172. See id. . 
173. Seeid. 
174. See id. The court's opinion did not indicate what services were actually 
provided to Russell and Aaron. 
175. Jackson, 956 P.2d at 39. 
176. See id. 
177. See id. The psychologist determined that many patients with clinical profiles 
similar to Russell's often have chronic emotional problems and paranoid personality 
disorders. See id. 
178. [d. 
179. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 39. 
180. See id. In 1984, Wallace also provided the court with this statement: 
As shown below, this worker sees little positive change in Deborah Russell 
Scott from 1980 to the present time. As demonstrated again and again in 
these reports, Debbie appears to be unable to control her anger, personal 
relationships, or her life, even with the threat of losing her child. In deference 
to the severity of breaking a mother·child bond, it is determined by this 
worker that such a break is the only reasonable recourse to assure [Aaron Jon 
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court terminated Russell's parental rights, as well as the pa-
rental rights of Aaron's two possible fathers, and awarded the 
State permanent custody ''with the right to consent to his adop-
tion."181 
B. THE ADOPTION 
In November 1983, the Jacksons submitted an adoption ap-
plication to the State. 182 As part of the application process, the 
Jacksons participated in several personal interviews with state 
resource worker Betty Petek. l83 During these interviews, the 
Jacksons advised Petek that they could not provide for a child 
who had a mental disorder or who might be at risk for devel-
oping one. l84 The Jacksons also indicated that they did not 
want to adopt a child whose familial background included 
''heavy drug or alcohol use during pregnancy."I85 After com-
pleting the necessary pre-adoption home study, Petek submit-
ted her recommendation that the Jacksons be approved for the 
adoption, noting that they were willing to consider adopting a 
child with a "minor correctable handicap."I86 In May 1984, the 
State followed Petek's recommendation and approved the Jack-
sons' request to become adoptive parents. 187 Soon thereafter, 
Jackson) his rights to an adequate physical and emotional environment to 
promote natural development .... 
Brief for Appellant at 13, Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d 35 (Mont. 1998) (No. 96-688). 
181. Jackson, 956 P.2d at 39. 
182. See id. 
183. See id. 
184. See id. The court's opinion does not indicate what reasons the Jacksons may 
have given for their inability to adopt a mentally ill child. The court only emphasized 
that the Jacksons would have chosen not to adopt Aaron had they known of his family 
background. See id. at 52. However, the Jacksons' brief indicates that, because of 
personal experience, they were concerned "about the mental stability of the prospective 
adoptive child [and) the mental health of the child's biological family." Brief for 
Appellant, supra note 180, at 15. 
185. Brieffor Appellant, supra note 180, at 15. 
186. Jackson, 956 P.2d at 39. The court did not indicate what the home study 
entailed. 
187. See id. at 39-40. Neither the court nor the Jacksons' brief indicated any other 
reason for the State's approval of the Jacksons' adoption application. At this point, the 
Jacksons had only been approved to become adoptive parents. Aaron was not available 
for adoption until September 1984. See id. at 39. 
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the Jacksons were advised that Aaron was available for adop-
tion.l88 
In January 1985, the Jacksons met with Petek and Wallace 
to discuss the adoption, Aaron's family background, and initi-
ating visits with him. 189 At this meeting, the Jacksons explic-
itly asked Wallace and Petek whether Aaron's familial history 
indicated that he would be at risk of developing a mental ill-
ness. l90 The Jacksons also asked for information concerning 
possible familial drug or alcohol abuse. 191 Despite their direct 
inquiries, Wallace and Petek told the Jacksons that Aaron was 
separated from his biological mother because she came from a 
"multi-generation welfare family" that was "socially inept" and 
could not care for him. l92 The Jacksons were also told that 
Aaron was hospitalized for aspiration after being fed solid food 
and soda. l93 However, although Wallace and Petek were each 
aware of the social study and the psychological reports re-
garding Aaron's biological parents at the time of the meeting, 
neither of them disclosed the content or the existence of these 
evaluations when responding to the Jacksons' inquiry. 194 
Wallace had some of the reports, including his own report to 
the court, in his possession at the time of the meeting. 195 When 
asked what the mother was like, Wallace and Petek told the 
Jacksons that she was physically healthy, that there was a 
possibility of minimal drug use before she was incarcerated, 
and that she did not meet Aaron's needs nor did she show an 
interest in learning the skills necessary to take care of him. 196 
188. See id. at 39. 
189. See id. at 40. 
190. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 40. 
191. See Brieffor Appellant, supra note 180, at 17. 
192. [d. 
193. See id. The Jacksons were also told that "although there may have been a 
possibility of some drug usage it was minimal since Debbie had been incarcerated for 
most of her pregnancy." [d. 
194. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 40. The court did not indicate why this information 
was withheld from the Jacksons. 
195. See id. "The State itself has admitted that it did not provide the Jacksons 
with information regarding either the birth mother's or putative fathers' psychological 
or emotional functioning." Brief for Appellant, supra note 180, at 18. 
196. See Jackson. 956 P.2d at 40. The court did not indicate what Aaron's needs 
were at this time. However, the inference was that Aaron's biological mother did not 
know how to care for any child, healthy or otherwise. 
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The district court fmalized Aaron's adoption in January 1986.197 
At no time prior to the adoption did the State disclose the rec-
ords to the Jacksons. 198 
By December 1987, Aaron had already begun to exhibit be-
havioral problems. l99 The Jacksons admitted Aaron to the 
Child Study Center in Montana where he was evaluated by Dr. 
Paul R. Crellin.2OO Dr. Crellin concluded that Aaron suffered 
from significant hyperactive attention deficit disorder, noting 
that it was impossible to attribute the disorder to either a ge-
netic trait or to the substance abuse in which Aaron's biological 
mother engaged during her pregnancy.201 
After Dr. Crellin's evaluation, Aaron had a "continuing his-
tory of psychological and emotional problems."202 Clinical psy-
chologists who evaluated Aaron in the years following Dr. 
Crellin's report at the Child Study Center diagnosed Aaron 
with various psychological problems.203 Such diagnoses in-
cluded attention deficit disorder with hyperactivity and with-
out hyperactivity in 1989, psychotic disorder in 1991 after hos-
pitalization in a youth psychiatric hospital, and pervasive de-
velopmental and learning disorders in 1994.204 Aaron was also 
197. See id. The court noted that the Jacksons visited Aaron numerous times and, 
in March 1985, entered into an adoptive placement agreement with the State. 
However, the court did not indicate who was caring for Aaron at this time or what 
contact the Jacksons had with Aaron between the time they entered into the adoptive 
placement agreement in 1985 and the time the District Court finalized Aaron's 
adoption in 1986. See id: 
198. See id. 
199. See id. 
200. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 40. The court indicated that Dr. Crellin performed a 
pediatric neurological evaluation. See id. 
201. See id. 
202. [d. at 41. 
203. See id. 
204. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 41. 
Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is a nervous disorder that 
usually affects children. The condition is characterized by very high levels of 
physical activity, consistently impulsive and immature behavior, and an 
extremely short attention span ... Although ADHD does no physical damage to 
the body, it can trigger long-lasting social, emotional, and educational 
problems ... [affected children] often appear to be immature, uncoordinated ... 
Some children may have attention deficit without hyperactivity. These 
children are more difficult to recognize .. , however, emotional problems can 
still develop ... The cause of ADHD is not known, but several theories have 
been proposed ... The condition may be the result of a [nervous system 
27
Emmaneel: Adoption Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
208 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:181 
rehospitalized at the psychiatric hospital twice in 1992 and, as 
of the time the court heard the case, had since been under the 
continuous care of a child psychiatrist and a clinical psycholo-
gist.205 
In late 1992, the Jacksons asked the State for assistance 
subsidies to care for Aaron.206 They claimed that as a result of 
Aaron's severe psychological problems, they were "devastated 
fmancially and physically and emotionally exhausted. "207 On 
behalf of the Jacksons, Petek requested that the State provide 
them maximum support.208 In her request, Petek wrote that 
"the current information available indicated that [Aaron is] 
suffering from conditions that are directly related to [his] bio-
logical family history. In researching the file, it appears that 
given the information then available it was, at best, naIve on 
our part in failing to assist these families."209 Subsequently, in 
1995, a neuropsychological evaluation found that Aaron exhib-
ited schizophrenic characteristics and that heredity was a sig-
nificant factor in this diagnosis.210 
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In April 1994, the Jacksons filed a negligence action in the 
Thirteenth Judicial District Court against the State of Mon-
malfunction, damage to the fetus during pregnancy, complications in 
childbirth, or inheritance) ... ADHD appears to occur more commonly in 
children of mothers who drank excessively or used cocaine during pregnancy. 
FAMILY MEDICAL HEALTH GUIDE, 513·514 (1996). 
205. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 4l. 
206. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 180, at 25. 
207. [d. at 25. 
208. See id. 
209. [d. 
210. Brief for Appellant, supra note 180, at 23. Dr. Joseph K. McElhinny, the 
neuropsychologist, also concluded that "long term, outside-the-home placement in a 
residential child care facility may have to be considered for Aaron in the future. He 
will remain a difficult child to care for. His management may become impossible as he 
becomes older and larger." [d. Aaron was also seen for a genetic consultation with Dr. 
John J.ohnson and Dr. Jeff Shaw at the Department of Medical Genetics. They 
concluded that "Aaron appears to have an organic psychiatric disorder, which will 
likely evolve into schizophrenia. His behavior patterns fit many diagnoses ... it is 
likely that he will have a life long disability related to his borderline psychosis and 
intellectual functioning and this may well become a more obvious problem as he gets 
older." [d. at 24. 
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tana, the Department of Family Services, and employees of the 
·Department of Family Services.2l1 The Jacksons claimed that 
the State was in breach of contract212 and that it was liable for 
negligent misrepresentation, negligent disclosure, and negli-
gent supervision for its misrepresentations and omissions re-
garding Aaron's familial background.213 
In August 1995, the State flled a motion for summary judg-
ment, alleging that the Jacksons failed to demonstrate a 
genuine issue of material fact as to each count of their com-
plaint.214 In November 1995, the Jacksons amended their com-
plaint, dropping the breach of contract claim215 and adding an-
other cause of action for "negligence based upon the doctrine of 
informed consent."216 The Jacksons brought suit as individuals 
211. Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d 35, 41 (Mont. 1998). 
212. See id. A breach of contract is defined as "a failure to perform any promise 
which forms the whole or part of a contract." Marci J. Blank, Adoption Nightmares 
Prompt Judicial Recognition of the Tort of Wrongful Adoption: Will New York Follow 
Suit?, 15 CORDOZO L. REV. 1687, 1691, n.19 (1994). Here, neither the court nor the 
Jacksons' brief indicated what the breach of contract claim entailed or how the State 
allegedly breached a contract with the Jacksons. 
213. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 41. See also KEETON, supra note 27, § 33, at 205-207: 
[d. 
Liability in negligence sometimes rests upon some form of misrepresentation 
on the part of the defendant, by which the plaintiff, or some third person, has 
been misled to the plaintiff's damage ... In all cases of negligent 
misrepresentation, however, the circumstances must be such that the 
defendant is under a duty to the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care in giving 
the information, and that reliance upon what he says, with resulting danger, 
is reasonably to be expected. 
In many situations, a failure to disclose the existence of a known danger may 
be the equivalent of misrepresentation, where it is to be expected that another 
will rely upon the appearance of safety ... the person who promises and then 
fails to pass on information important to another's welfare ... may be held 
liable to the person with whom he deals, or to others to whom harm is to be 
expected through that person's reliance. 
[d., § 33, at 207-208. Here, the Jacksons alleged that the State was negligent in its 
disclosures and representations regarding Aaron's background and in its supervision 
over the adoption proceeding. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 41. See also Brief for 
Appellant, supra note 180, at 2. 
214. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 41. 
215. See id. In it's Motion for Summary Judgment, the State requested a dismissal 
of the Jacksons' breach of contract claim "on the grounds that Montana law [did} not 
recognize a cause of action for breach of contract in the adoption context ... The 
Jacksons voluntarily conceded to" this motion. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 180, 
at 2-3. 
216. Jackson, 956 P.2d at 41. The Jacksons alleged that as potential adoptive 
parents "they were not given full and accurate non-identifying information on [Aaron} 
as mandated by common law and statutory law, thus, denying them the opportunity to 
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and as "parents and next of friends of Aaron Jon Jackson."217 
The State renewed its motion for summary judgment in April 
1996 and filed a supplemental motion for summary judgment, 
alleging that: (1) the Jacksons "failed to state a cla:im upon 
which relief can be granted on behalf of Aaron"; (2) the State 
did not have a duty to disclose all information regarding 
Aaron's background; and (3) the failure to disclose the informa-
tion did not cause the Jacksons' injuries. 218 
In November 1996, the district court granted the State's 
motions for summary judgment on the grounds that the Jack-
sons proved neither that the State had a duty to disclose nor 
that, even if a duty existed, the State's breach caused their in-
juries.219 In granting summary judgment to the State, court 
. concluded that the Jacksons did not prove that the State had a 
common law or statutory duty to fully disclose Aaron's psycho-
logical and medical background to them, and thus was not li-
able for negligent nondisclosure.220 With regard to the Jack-
sons' negligent misrepresentation claim, the district court held 
that the Jacksons could not meet their burden of proving that 
the State had a duty to disclose Aaron's background to them. 221 
The court reasoned that the Jacksons "failed to demonstrate 
the requisite element of foreseeability. "222 The district court 
further reasoned that the Jacksons failed to show that the 
State "knew or should have known" that withholding Aaron's 
psychological and medical background from the Jacksons would 
result in injury.223 Thus, the district court concluded the Jack-
sons did not fulfill their burden of establishing that the State 
make an informed decision about the adoption." Brief for Appellant, supra note 180, at 
4. 
217. Jackson, 956 P.2d at 4l. 
218. Brief for Appellant, supra note 180, at 4. The State also alleged that the 
Jacksons' claims were barred by the three year statute of limitations imposed on tort 
claims. The district court entered an order determining that there existed "a genuine 
issue of material fact of when the Jacksons discovered or should have discovered the 
cause of the injury which they claim they suffered and whether the withholding of the 
information prevented them from discovering the cause of injury." [d. at 4-5. 
219. See id. at 5. 
220. See Jackson, 956 P.2d. at 43. 
221. See id. at 47. 
222. [d. 
223. See id. 
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had a duty to inform them of Aaron's familial or medical his-
tory.224 
The Jacksons appealed this decision directly to the Montana 
Supreme COurt.225 The Montana Supreme Court granted re-
view to determine whether the district court erred in its con-
clusions that: (1) the State did not have a common law or statu-
tory duty to disclose information regarding Aaron's background 
to the Jacksons; and (2) no genuine issue of material fact ex-
isted "regarding a causal connection between the State's alleg-
edly negligent conduct and the Jacksons' injuries."226 
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS 
On appeal, the Jacksons claimed that the district court 
erred in determining that the State did not have a common law 
or statutory duty to fully and accurately disclose all non-
identifYing background information about Aaron that would 
have assisted them in their decision to adopt him. 227 The Jack-
sons also claimed that the district court erred in determining 
that they failed to establish that the State's alleged negligent 
breach was causally connected to Aaron's mental condition. 228 
The Jackson court began its analysis by questioning 
whether Montana should recognize a negligence-based cause of 
action for wrongful adoption.229 Following Gibbs v. Ernst and 
Mallette v. Children's Friend and Service, the court fIrst re-
quired a determination as to whether traditional common law 
causes of action such as negligence should be applied to adop-
tion cases.230 After fInding that foreseeability requirements 
and public policy interests imposed a common law duty upon 
the State to refrain from negligently misrepresenting Aaron's 
background, the court turned to Montana's disclosure statutes 
224. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 47. 
225. See id. at 41. In Montana, rmal judgments from the District Court are 
appealed to the Montana Supreme Court. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-20-72 (1997). 
226. Jackson, 956 P.2d. at 38. 
227. See Brieffor Appellant, supra note 180, at 1. 
228. See id. 
229. Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d 35, 43 (Mont. 1998). 
230. See id. at 42 (citing Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 886 (Pa. 1994». 
31
Emmaneel: Adoption Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
212 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:181 
to determine whether the State also had an independent statu-
tory duty to disclose certain information to the Jacksons. 231 
The court decided that Montana's disclosure statutes and the 
State's own policy manual together imposed a statutory duty 
upon the State to fully and accurately disclose any information 
that it had regarding Aaron's background.232 Finally, the court 
discussed the causal connection between the State's alleged 
negligence and the injuries sustained by the Jacksons, holding 
that the State did not demonstrate a lack of causal connec-
tion.233 
A. THE RECOGNITION OF NEGLIGENCE-BASED WRONGFUL 
ADOPTION 
The primary issue addressed by the Montana Supreme 
Court in Jackson was whether Montana law should recognize 
wrongful adoption claims.234 The court reviewed the holdings of 
other state courts that found wrongful adoption claims to be 
mere extensions of common law actions of fraud and negli-
gence.235 It then decided that determining whether Montana 
should recognize the tort of wrongful adoption rested on 
whether an adoption agency had a common law duty to refrain 
from negligent misrepresentation or a statutory duty to fully 
disclose a child's background to adoptive parents. 236 
Since the Jacksons' complaint was negligence-based, the 
court fIrst addressed whether the State had a legal duty to the 
Jacksons. 237 The State contended that it did not have a com-
mon law duty to refrain from misrepresenting Aaron's back-
ground because it did not mislead the Jacksons.238 The State 
further argued that imposition of any duty to disclose, whether 
231. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 49. 
232. See id. at 50-51. 
233. See id. at 51-53. 
234. See id. at 42. 
235. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 42. See also discussion supra part II. 
236. See id. at 42-43. 
237. See id. In order to establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove that a 
duty existed, the duty was breached, the breach caused injury, and the plaintiff 
sustained damages. See id. 
238. See id. at 43. 
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common law or statutory, would conflict with Montana's statu-
tory duty to keep the biological parents' medical records confi-
dential. 239 As a result, the Montana Supreme Court discussed 
an adoption agency's duty to disclose under common law and 
statutory law separately.240 The court began its analysis by 
inquiring whether the State, having in its possession informa-
tion regarding Aaron's medical and familial background, had a 
common law duty to avoid negligently misrepresenting Aaron's 
background to the Jacksons during the adoption process. 241 
The court then addressed whether Montana's disclosure stat-
utes mandated that the State fully and accurately disclose to 
the Jacksons all it knew of Aaron's background.242 
1. Common Law Duty To Refrain From Negligent Misrepre-
sentation 
In determining whether the State had a common law duty 
to refrain from negligently misrepresenting Aaron's back-
ground to the Jacksons, the court noted that Montana had 
"long recognized the common law tort of negligent misrepresen-
tation. »243 To prevail on a negligent misrepresentation claim, 
the Jacksons were not required to show fraud or intent to mis-
represent on the part of the State.244 Instead, the Jacksons 
only had to show that the State failed to use reasonable care in 
its representations regarding Aaron's background. 245 The court 
emphasized that a duty to use reasonable care was a required 
element in all actions for negligent misrepresentation. 246 The 
existence of this duty was based on both the foreseeability that 
Aaron would develop emotional or psychological problems and 
the underlying policy concerns regarding the State's liability. 247 
239. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 43. 
240. See discussion infra part V.B for the court's analysis regarding an adoption 
agency's common law duty to refrain from negligent misrepresentation. See discussion 
infra part V.C for the court's analysis regarding an adoption agency's statutory duty to 
disclose. 
241. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 42. 
242. See id. at 51. 
243. [d. at 43. 
244. See id. 
245. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 43. 
246. See id. 
247. See id. at 44-48. 
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Accordingly, the court examined each of these factors sepa-
rately. 
a. Foreseeability 
In determining whether the State could have foreseen that 
Aaron would eventually develop emotional and psychological 
problems, the court relied on the holding in Gibbs that an 
adoption agency could only be liable for conditions that the 
agency could have reasonably predicted at the time of adop-
tion.248 In accordance with Gibbs, the Montana Supreme Court 
held that the State could only be found to have a duty of due 
care to the Jacksons if it was reasonably foreseeable that Aaron 
was at risk of developing mental health problems based on his 
familial history. 249 However, the court made it clear that the 
Jacksons only had to show that it was reasonably foreseeable 
that a genetic link existed between Aaron's health problems 
and those of his biological parents.250 They did not have to 
prove the presence of a genetic link with "absolute scientific 
and medical certainty.''251 The court noted that the State's own 
witness, Dr. John Talbot Blodgett, testified in a deposition that 
there was enough medical knowledge in the early 1980s to un-
derstand the biological risks to Aaron. 252 The court held that, 
based on what the State knew about Aaron's background at the 
time of the adoption, it could have reasonably foreseen that 
Aaron might eventually develop psychological and emotional 
problems.253 
b. Public Policy 
The court next addressed whether public policy required 
that a duty be imposed upon the State to refrain from negli-
248. See id. at 47 (citing Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994)). 
249. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 48. 
250. See id. 
251. [d. 
252. See id. Dr. Blodgett testified that "given the diagnoses of the mother and the 
putative father ... that even by 1980, '82, '83 standards, that there was enough known 
of familial patterns that we understood that there were significant biological risks to 
people who were first degree relatives to people with those diagnoses." [d. 
253. See Jackson, 956 P .2d at 48. 
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gently misrepresenting Aaron's background to the Jacksons. 2M 
The Montana courts had not yet considered the public policy 
considerations regarding the State's duty to use due care in 
adoption disclosures.255 In addressing the issue, the court re-
lied on Gibbs and Mallette, both of which recognized negligent 
misrepresentation claims in adoption situations.256 These ju-
risdictions found that the adoption agency had a duty to use 
due care in disclosing a child's medical and familial history to 
potential adoptive parents. 257 The Montana Supreme Court 
noted that, in recognizing that such a duty exists, the decisions 
of other jurisdictions rested heavily on whether the adoption 
agency had voluntarily begun to disclose information regarding 
the child's health to the potential adoptive parents.258 Once the 
adoption agency began to disclose, it then had a duty to use due 
care so as not to misrepresent facts regarding the child's back-
ground. 259 The Montana Supreme Court also recognized that 
virtually all of the courts that addressed wrongful adoption dis-
cussed whether the adoption agency's duty to use due care ex-
isted under common law.260 To do this, other jurisdictions bal-
anced various conflicting policy concerns. 261 
The Montana Supreme Court followed the reasoning in 
Gibbs, highlighting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's consid-
erations regarding public policy. 262 The court concluded that 
the imposition of a duty to use due care in disclosing a child's 
background would ensure that adoptive parents are fmancially 
and emotionally able to raise the child, thereby preventing 
failed .adoptions resulting from placement of special needs chil-
254. See id. at 44. 
255. See id. 
256. See id. See also Mallette v. Children's Friend and Serv., 661 A.2d 67 (R.I. 
1992); Gibbsv. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882 (Pa.1994). 
257. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 44. 
258. See id. 
259. See id. 
260. See id. 
261. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 44. 
262. See id. at 44·45. The court analyzed the facts and rationale of the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania in Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994). See also discussion 
supra Part III. 
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dren with families unable to cope with them.263 The court fur-
ther relied on Mallette, reasoning that an adoption agency 
must only refrain from volunteering any representations at all 
to avoid liability or, at the very least, to make representations 
non-negligently. 264 
In the instant case, the State conceded that the Jacksons 
were warned of possible drug or alcohol use by Aaron's biologi-
cal mother at the onset of her pregnancy, that she was unable 
to care for him, and that she had caused him to be hospitalized 
for aspiration when he was an infant.265 The Jacksons were 
further told that Aaron's biological mother was from a welfare 
family, but that she was physically healthy.266 Joining the ma-
jority of courts that considered the issue of negligent misrepre-
sentation in wrongful adoption cases at the time of its deci-
sion,267 the Montana Supreme Court concluded that recognizing 
a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation would pro-
mote the desirable public policy of allowing adoptive parents to 
be fully aware of the potential future needs of the child. 268 
Agreeing with the conclusions of other courts that the determi-
nation hinged on the adoption agency's voluntary offering of 
information,269 the court further concluded that once the State 
began volunteering information to the Jacksons, it "assumed a 
263. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 45 (citing Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 887). The court did not 
go into any more detail regarding this issue. However, the portion of Gibbs that the 
court cites stated that "ignorance of medical or psychological history can prevent the 
adopting parents and their doctors from providing effective treatment, or any 
treatment at all." Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 886-887. 
264. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 45-46. Here, the court analyzed the facts and 
decision of Mallette v. Children's Friend & Serv., 661 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1995). 
265. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 46. 
266. See ill. 
267. See discussion supra Part II. 
268. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 46. 
269. See id. The court wrote: 
This court has similarly recognized the fundamental principle that, where a 
person undertakes to do an act or discharge a duty by which the conduct of 
another may be properly regulated and governed, he is bound to perform it in 
such a manner that those who are rightfully led to a course of conduct or 
action on the faith that the act or duty will be duly and properly performed 
shall not suffer loss or injury by reason of negligent failure so to perform it. 
Id. (quoting Stewart v. Standard Publ'g Co., 55 P.2d 694, 696 (Mont. 1936». 
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duty to do so with due care. "270 Although the court recognized 
that its decision placed a higher burden on the State, it felt 
that this burden was justified by the need for adoptive parents 
like the Jacksons to receive as much information regarding a 
child's medical and familial history as the adoption agency has 
available.271 The court noted that as a result of holding adop-
tion agencies to a higher standard of care, public trust in State 
agencies and public confidence in the adoption process would 
inevitably increase.272 The court concluded that "public policy 
considerations justify the imposition of a duty upon the State 
in the present case. "273 
Consequently, the court held that once the State began vol-
unteering information regarding Aaron's medical and familial 
history, it assumed a duty to use due care in its representa-
tions to the Jacksons. 274 Thus, the State had a duty to abstain 
from negligently misrepresenting Aaron's background. 275 Fur-
ther, the court found that whether or not the State breached 
that duty by negligently misrepresenting Aaron's background 
was a genuine issue of material fact and, as such, reversed the 
district court's grant of the State's motion for summary judg-
ment.276 Accordingly, the court recognized the common law 
cause of action of negligent misrepresentation as a viable claim 
in a wrongful adoption case.277 
2. The Statutory Duty To Refrain From Negligent Non-
Disclosure 
After finding that an adoption agency had a common law 
duty to refrain from negligent misrepresentation, the court 
next addressed whether the State had a statutory duty to fully 
270. [d. at 46. " ... to require anything less from the State than the exercise of due 
care in the dissemination of information in its possession to prospective adoptive 
parents would be simply unacceptable." [d. 
271. Seeid. at 47. 
272. See Jackson. 956 P.2d at 47. 
273. [d. 
274. See id. at 48-49. 
275. See id. at 49. 
276. See Jackson. 956 P.2d at 49. 
277. See id. 
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disclose Aaron's medical and familial history to the Jacksons.278 
The Jacksons claimed that such a duty existed pursuant to the 
Uniform Adoption Act of Montana, which required the State to 
disclose "all available non-identifying information" regarding a 
child's familial background. 279 The State, on the other hand, 
argued that it fulfIlled its limited duty of disclosure under 
Montana Code Annotated (MCA) section 40-8-122(1)(c), which 
did not mandate that any parental history be disclosed to adop-
tive parents, but merely required that the medical and social 
history of the child be provided. 28O The State contended that 
since Montana statutory law prevented it from disclosing psy-
chological reports of Aaron's biological parents, it satisfied its 
statutory duty when it disclosed general information about 
Aaron's background to the Jacksons.281 
The court conceded that MCA section 40-8-122(1) did not 
specillcally set out criteria regarding what information an 
adoption agency had to include in the medical and social histo-
ries it provided to potential parents. 282 However, the court re-
jected the State's argument, fmding that the State's own poli-
cies and procedures manual fIlled in the gap.283 The manual 
278. See id. 
279. [d. The court did not explain which provision of the Uniform Adoption Act of 
Montana the Jacksons claimed to be applicable. nor did in go into further detail about 
the Act. 
280. See Jackson. 956 P.2d at 49. Section 40-8-122 of the Montana Code provided 
that: 
(1) Upon the filing of a petition for adoption the court shall order an 
investigation to be made by the [State] or by a licensed child-placing agency or 
other person named by the court ... The report of investigation shall be filed 
with the court by the investigator at the time the petition is filed or within 30 
days from the issuance of the order for investigation. unless the time therefor 
is extended by the court. The report of the investigation shall state: ... (c) that 
medical and social histories have been provided to the adoptive parent. 
[d. In 1997. the adoption statutes applicable at the time Jackson was decided were 
repealed and replaced by the Montana Adoption Act. See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 42-1-
101- 42-1-111 (1997). 
281. See Jackson. 956 P.2d at 49. 
282. See id. at 50. 
283. See id. 
The Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services Policies and Procedures 
Manual § CSD-SS 602-1 specifically provide[d] that: Preparation for adoptive 
placement is a team process involving the child with his social worker. foster 
parents. birth parents. adoptive parents. and resource worker. The child's 
social worker is the primary person in the process ... The child and his 
adoptive family need to have all available information on the child and his 
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specifically acknowledged the need for adoptive families to 
have any information available to the adoption agency regard-
ing a child and his biological background.284 Further, MeA sec-
tion 40-8-122(1)(c) mandated that adoption agencies provide 
adoptive parents with the child's "medical and social histo-
ries."285 The court found that, together, these two provisions 
created a statutory duty upon the State to "fully and accurately 
disclose all relevant. information, including psychological re-
ports, regarding an adoptee and his or her [biological] fam-
ily."286 
The State further argued that the version of MeA section 
41-3-205 in effect at the time of Aaron's adoption precluded it 
from disclosing information regarding child protection services 
files without a court order authorizing it. 287 The court found 
this argument lacked merit.288 Instead, the court concluded 
that two options were available to the State.289 First, the State 
could have tried to obtain a court order, thus allowing it to 
comply with MeA section 41-3-205, as well as its own poli-
cies.290 Doing so would have allowed the State to disclose in-
formation contained in Aaron's child protection services files, 
which included his biological mother's psychological evalua-
tions, to the Jacksons.291 Alternatively, if the State had been 
denied an order, it could have informed the Jacksons that due 
to their concerns regarding Aaron's medical background they 
[d. 
birth family. This information shall include: (1) Background information on 
biological parents ... ; (2) Daily schedules ... ; (3) Child's Social Study with 
identifying information removed; (4) Current child's medical record ... ; (5) Life 
story book; (6) Psychological evaluation; (7) School records; and (8) Social 
Security number. 
284. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 50 (quoting The Department of Social and 
Rehabilitation Services Policies and Procedures Manual § CSD-SS 602-1). 
285. Jackson, 956 P.2d at 50. This version of section 40-8-122(1)(c) of the Montana 
Code was in effect at the time of Aaron's adoption. See supra note 280. 
286. [d. 
287. See id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-205 (1985)). This section of the 
Montana code was also repealed and replaced by the Montana Adoption Act. See supra 
note 280. . 
288. See id. 
289. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 50. 
290. See id. 
291. See id. 
39
Emmaneel: Adoption Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
220 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:181 
might want to consider adopting another child.292 Had the 
State engaged in such a procedure, it would have maintained 
confidentiality while at the same time notifying the Jacksons 
that Aaron's medical and familial background increased his 
risk of developing psychological problems. 293 The court thus 
concluded that the State had a statutorily imposed duty to dis-
close to the Jacksons all relevant factors regarding Aaron's his-
tory.294 Since the allegation that the State breached a duty to 
the Jacksons constituted an issue of material fact, the court 
reversed the district court's grant of the State's motion for 
summary judgment. 295 
B. CAUSATION 
After rmding that the State had a common law duty to re-
frain from negligent misrepresentation and a statutory duty to 
"fully and accurately disclose" information regarding Aaron's 
background, the court next addressed the issue of causation. 296 
The district court held that the Jacksons did not establish that 
"the State's conduct helped 'produce the injury complained of' 
because [they] failed to adequately demonstrate that 'the in-
formation allegedly withheld by the [State] relative to the child 
and his heredity [was] causally connected to the child's current 
medical condition.'''297 Specifically, the Supreme Court ques-
tioned whether the district court erred in concluding that the 
Jacksons failed to prove that the State's'conduct in withholding 
292. See id. 
293. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 50. 
294. See id. at 51. 
295. See id. Before turning to causation, the court briefly discussed rules 
concerning motions for summary judgment. See id. The court noted that since the 
State was the party moving for summary judgment, it had the initiai burden of proving 
that the Jacksons had not demonstrated that a genuine issue of material fact existed. 
See id. Only after the State satisfied its burden would the burden shift to the Jacksons 
to show that "by more than mere denial and speculation" a genuine issue of material 
fact did exist. [d. 
296. [d. In order for a plaintiff to recover for the negligence of another party, the 
plaintiff must not only demonstrate that the defendant breached a duty to the plaintiff. 
but also that there exists "some reasonable connection between the act or omission of 
the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." KEETON. supra note 
27, § 41. at 263. 
297. Jackson. 956 P.2d at 51. 
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or misrepresenting information contributed to the Jacksons' 
injuries. 298 
The State argued that in order to prove causation, the Jack-
sons had to prove that the information allegedly withheld 
"relative to [Aaron] and his heredity" helped produce Aaron's 
condition.299 The Jacksons, on the other hand, contended that 
they only needed to satisfy the traditional "but for" test. 3OO This 
test required the Jacksons to establish that, but for the State's 
misrepresentation of Aaron's psychological and familial back-
ground, "the Jacksons would not have adopted Aaron and, con-
sequently, would have suffered no injuries."301 Based on Mon-
tana case law, the court agreed with the Jacksons' contention 
that in order to prove causation, they only had to satisfy the 
"but for" test by establishing that the State's conduct helped 
produce their injuries and that they would not have suffered 
injuries at all but for that conduct.302 
In order to complete its causation analysis, the court next 
identified the Jacksons' injuries.303 In their amended com-
plaint, the Jacksons sought compensatory damages for the se-
vere emotional and fmancial injuries they suffered as a result 
298. See id. 
299. Id. 
300. See id. The "but for" test is used to determine tort liability by ascertaining 
whether "the event would not have occurred but for [the defendant'sl conduct; 
conversely, the defendant's conduct is not the cause of the event, if the event would 
have occurred without it." KEEToN, supra note 27, § 41, at 266. 
301. Jackson, 956 P.2d at 51. 
302. See w.. at 52. The court discussed its decision in Busta v. Columbus Hospital 
Corp., 916 P.2d 122, 139 (Mont. 1996), in which it decided that it would "no longer 
consider forseeability as an element of causation." Busta, 916 P.2d at 139. Instead, the 
court in Busta held that "in those cases which do not involve issues of intervening 
cause, proof of causation is satisfied by proof that a party's conduct was a cause-in-fact 
of the damage alleged." Id. As stated in KEETON, supra note 27, § 41, at 266, a party's 
conduct "is a cause-in-fact of an event if the event would not have occurred but for that 
conduct; conversely, the defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event 
would have occurred without it." Id. The court went on to note that in Busta, the court 
decided that "the appropriate causation instruction is as follows: 'The defendant's 
conduct is a cause of injury if it helped produce it and if the injury would not have 
occurred without it.''' Jackson, 956 P.2d at 51-52 (quoting Busta; 916 P.2d at 139). 
303. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 52. 
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of the adoption. 304 In its decision, the district court defmed the 
Jacksons' injuries solely as ''the emotional distress and finan-
cial responsibility for medical attention."305 However, the Su-
preme Court found this description inaccurate, explaining that 
the district court's interpretation of injuries was not what the 
Jacksons claimed.306 Rather, the Jacksons' general claim was 
that, as a consequence of the adoption, they suffered emotional 
and fmancial damages.307 These damages, they argued, were 
due to the State's misrepresentation and withholding of infor-
mation regarding Aaron's background.308 As a result of the 
State's negligent conduct, the State prevented the Jacksons 
from making an informed decision, thereby causing them to 
adopt a child that they would not have otherwise adopted. 309 
In response, the State argued that whether or not the Jack-
sons would have continued with the adoption had they known 
of Aaron's background was not the issue.310 However, the court 
disagreed, noting that decisions from several other jurisdic-
tions, including the courts in Burr and Mallette, also considered 
whether the adoptive parents would have adopted the child 
despite the adoption agency's misrepresentations.311 If proven, 
the court concluded that any emotional or fmancial hardships 
the Jacksons suffered necessarily resulted from the State's 
negligence.312 
Having concluded that the element of causation rested on 
whether the Jacksons would not have adopted Aaron but for 
the State's misrepresentations and withholding of information, 
the court acknowledged that the State would not be held liable 
304. See Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint to the District Court at 7-8, Jackson 
v. Montana, (No. DV 94-372 (1995)). 
305. Jackson, 956 P.2d at 52. 
306. See id. 
307. See id. The court did not specify what the emotional and fmancial damages 
were. 
308. See id. 
309. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 52. 
310. See id. 
311. See id. at 52-53. The court acknowledged that many of the courts in 
jurisdictions that addressed wrongful adoption did not discuss the issue of causation. 
See id. 
312. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 53. 
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for future medical conditions that it in no way could predict. 313 
It further cautioned against holding any adoption agency re-
sponsible for guaranteeing a child's future health. 314 The court 
noted that the foreseeability requirement demanded by an 
adoption agency's common law and statutory duties precluded 
imposition of such liability. 315 Thus, the court held that the 
district court relied on an incorrect causation standard, having 
focused on foreseeability.316 As a result, the court concluded 
there remained an issue of material fact as to whether the 
Jacksons would have adopted Aaron had the State refrained 
from allegedly withholding or misrepresenting Aaron's back-
ground.317 
C. THE COURTS CONCLUSION 
The Montana Supreme Court joined the majority of jurisdic-
tions in recognizing the negligence-based tort of wrongful adop-
tion, finding that both common law and Montana statutory law 
imposed duties upon the State.3lS First, the court held that 
foreseeability and public policy requirements imposed a com-
mon law duty upon the State to refrain from negligently mis-
representing Aaron's background to the Jacksons. 319 Based on 
what the State knew about Aaron's background, it could have 
reasonably foreseen that Aaron would eventually develop emo-
tional and psychological problems.320 Further, public policy re-
quired that once the State began to divulge information to the 
Jacksons, it assumed a duty to use due care in its representa-
tions.321 Second, the court found that Montana's disclosure 
313. See id. at 52. The court used the development of diabetes as an example of a 
future medical condition that an adoption agency could not predict. See id. 
314. See id. 
315. See id. See discussion supra V.B.1. 
316. See Jackson. 956 P.2d at 53. 
317. See id. The court did not address the issue of proximate cause. The court 
probably did not address the issue because foreseeability. which is often used to 
determine proximate cause. is no longer recognized as an element of causation in 
Montana. See Busta v. Columbus Hosp. Corp .• 916 P.2d 122 (Mont. 1996). See also 
KEETON. supra note 27. § 42. at 273-274. 
318. Jackson. 956 P.2d at 48-49. 51. 
319. See id. at 47-48. 
320. See id. at 48. 
321. See id. at 47. 
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statute, in conjunction with the State's adoption policy manual, 
imposed a duty to fully and adequately disclose what it knew 
regarding Aaron's background to the Jacksons. 322 Finally, the 
court held that the Jacksons could prove that the State's al-
leged withholding of information and misrepresentations were 
causally connected to their emotional and financial injuries by 
demonstrating that they would have elected not to adopt Aaron 
had the State adequately disclosed his biological history to 
them.323 Thus, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the dis-
trict court's decision, rmding that the Jacksons established a 
viable cause of action for negligence-based wrongful adoption, 
and remanded the case for further proceedings. 324 
IV. CRITIQUE: MONTANA CORRECTLY RECOGNIZED 
NEGLIGENCE-BASED WRONGFUL ADOPTION BUT DID 
NOT EXPAND AN ADOPTION AGENCY'S LIABILITY FAR 
ENOUGH 
Although all states have enacted disclosure statutes, most 
only require minimum disclosure by adoption agencies. 325 Mon-
tana's disclosure statute is no exception. Although the Mon-
tana Supreme Court concluded that the State had a duty to 
refrain from negligent misrepresentations in the adoption con-
text, it did nothing more than leave minimum disclosure re-
322. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 51. 
323. See id. at 53. 
324. See id. at 53. (Trieweiller, J., concurring). Justice Trieweiler agreed with the 
result, but disagreed with the court's analysis. He concluded that once the court 
determined that the State had a statutory duty to disclose Aaron's background, it was 
unnecessary to decide' whether such a duty existed at common law. Such a 
determination would encourage trial courts to analyze on a case by case basis whether 
a causal connection exists between the information an agency withheld and the 
illnesses that a child develops "when, in fact, such an analysis is irrelevant to the 
establishment of a duty imposed by statute in Montana." Id. at 53-54. Justice 
Trieweiler also stated: 
Id. 
We have previously held that statutes establish a duty. It is assumed that 
when the Legislature enacts statutes, or administrative agencies enact rules, 
they do so because of the foreseeability of harm if the statute or rule is not 
followed. It is also assumed that statutes, and administrative rules which are 
consistent with those statutes, are a reflection of public policy in Montana. 
325. For example, California's disclosure statute requires only that an adoption 
agency "effectuate the effective and discrete transmission to adoptees or prospective 
adoptive parents of pertinent medical information ... ." CAL. FAM. CODE § 8608 (West 
1984). 
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quirements intact. As the court noted, the disclosure statute in 
effect at the time it decided Jackson required an adoption 
agency to investigate and provide adoptive parents with a 
child's medical and social histories.326 However, the State 
pointed out that Montana's disclosure statute did not specify 
what information or documents an adoption agency was re-
quired to include in the medical and social histories that it was 
to provide.327 Further, Montana's disclosure statute did not 
require an adoption agency to disclose a child's familial psy-
chological background. 328 
In analyzing an adoption agency's duty to disclose under 
Montana statutory law, the court did not go far enough. In-
stead of taking advantage of the opportunity to interpret Mon-
tana's disclosure statute broadly, the court chose to rely on the 
State's policy manual in conjunction with the plain language of 
the statute.329 The plain language of the statute alone, man-
dating that adoption agencies provide adoptive parents with a 
child's medical and social histories,330 provided the court with 
ample opportunity to broadly expand statutory adoption agency 
liability. 
326. The disClosure statute in effect at the time Jackson v. Montana was decided 
read: 
(1) Upon the filing of a petition for adoption the court shall order an 
investigation to be made by the [State) or by a licensed child·placing agency or 
other person named by the court ... The report of investigation shall be filed 
with the court by the investigator at the time the petition is filed or within 30 
days from the issuance of the order for investigation, unless the time therefor 
is extended by the court. The report of the investigation shall state: ... (c) that 
medical and social histories have been provided to the adoptive parent .... 
See Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d 35, 49 (Mont. 1998). Montana's current disclosure 
statute reads: (1) "the [agency) shall provide a prospective adoptive parent with social 
and medical histories of the birth families; (2) in direct parental placement adoption, 
the birth family social and medical histories must be completed on a form .... n MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 42·3·101 (1997). 
327. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 49. 
328. See id. 
329. See id. at 50. 
330. See id. 
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A. INTERPRETING DISCLOSURE STATUTES To REQUIRE 
DISCLOSURE OF ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION 
The Montana Supreme Court should have interpreted the 
disclosure statute broadly by increasing disclosure require-
ments, demanding nothing less than disclosure of all available 
information concerning the child's background. Extensive dis-
closure is necessary to allow adoptive parents to consider all 
factors before making a life-long commitment to care for a 
child.331 Such disclosures should include specific and detailed 
information regarding the physical and mental health history 
of the child and his extended biological family. 332 Since many 
illnesses skip generations or lie dormant, specific disclosures 
would educate adoptive parents about the potential needs of 
their child, allowing them to better prepare for the child's fu-
ture.333 Additionally, such disclosures would ensure that a 
child, when grown, would know his biological history.334 Even 
though non-adoptive birth parents do not receive a disclosure 
statement in the delivery room, most know, or at least have the 
opportunity to fmd out, the physical and mental histories of 
their extended families. Adoptive parents should be afforded 
the same opportunity. 
B. EXPANDING ADOPTION AGENCY LIABILITY To INCLUDE A 
DuTY To INVESTIGATE AND A DuTY To WARN 
Although Montana's disclosure statute required adoption 
agencies to perform an investigation regarding a child's medi-
cal and social histories, the Montana Supreme Court did not 
defme what that investigation should entail or what informa-
331. See James, supra note 11, at 744 (recommending that state legislatures create 
broader disclosure statutes). 
332. See id. at 724 (recommending mandatory background reports). 
333. See Dickson, supra note 22, at 945. For example, a child born to an HIV-
positive mother may test positive for HIV antibodies for up to 15 months after birth 
regardless of whether he actually carries the virus. On the other hand, children who 
test negative for HIV may simply be in the early stages of the virus' development. 
Further, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome mayor may not manifest in children born to alcoholic 
mothers. See id. at 963 n.246. 
334. This author concedes that some tests may not accurately predict an illness nor 
can it be guaranteed that a child will develop an illness at all. See James, supra note 
11, at 723. 
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tion it should produce. The increasing number of wrongful 
adoption claims in recent years suggests that state disclosure 
statutes alone are inadequately protecting adoptive parents 
and their children.335 As part of the adoption process, adoption 
agencies should be required to make reasonable investigations 
into the backgrounds of all children put up for adoption and 
should have a mandatory duty to warn prospective parents of 
the risks inherent in adopting a special needs child. 
1. Duty to Investigate 
The Montana Supreme Court should have imposed upon 
adoption agencies a specific duty to conduct a reasonable inves-
tigation of a child's background. Admittedly, the determination 
of what and how much investigation constitutes a reasonable 
investigation under the circumstances can ultimately result in 
subjective analyses by state courts since there is no bright line 
rule.336 However, courts have often been faced with standards 
that lack a bright line rule, as is the case with any negligence 
standard.337 Despite the absence of a bright line rule, courts 
can decide which factors should be considered when determin-
ing if the adoption agency's investigation was reasonable. 338 
Such factors should include, but of course are not limited to, 
practicality of birth parent interviews, release of records con-
cerning previous state intervention, and opportunities for doc-
tor's examinations, medical tests, and psychological evalua-
tions.339 
The Montana Supreme Court was not the first court to 
avoid the issue of an adoption agency's duty to investigate. To 
date, all state courts that have addressed wrongful adoption 
335. A Berkeley Study indicated that, as of 1991, one-half of the parents who 
adopted sexually abused children, one-third of the parents who adopted physically 
abused children, and one-third of the parents who adopted children with learning 
disabilities were not informed of their child's condition by the adoption agency at the 
time of the adoption. See Dickson, supra note 22, at 946. 
336. See When Love Is Not Enough, supra note 18, at 1773. 
337. See id. (acknowledging that adoption investigations of abandoned children will 
ultimately produce less, if any, information than will an investigation of a child whose 
custody has been awarded to the state years before his adoption). 
338. See id. 
339. Seeid. at 1773-1774. 
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have been reluctant to impose a duty to investigate upon adop-
tion agencies.340 The court in Gibbs explicitly declined to im-
pose such a duty, choosing instead to rely on the Pennsylvania' 
statute's implication that a good faith effort to obtain a child's 
medical record was sufficient. 341 The Gibbs court suggested 
that a duty to investigate would impose an undue burden on 
adoption agencies, strain resources, and reduce the number of 
successful adoptions. 342 
Imposition of a duty to perform a reasonable investigation 
in good faith, however, would not unduly burden adoption 
agencies. First, the increased burden imposed upon adoption 
agencies is outweighed by the burden that adoptive parents 
unknowingly assume when they adopt a special needs child. 343 
Second, although adoption agencies will have a duty to investi-
gate, such a duty would not require any more than a reason-
able inquiry into the child's background.344 For example, a rea-
sonable investigation might include the child's genetic back-
ground as well as doctor evaluations based on a standard 
physical and psychological examinations.345 Accordingly, adop-
tion agencies could protect their interests while at the same 
time providing complete and accurate information to adoptive 
parents by issuing a disclaimer of any information that was not 
included in the investigation or any tests that were not per-
formed. 346 As a result, adoptive parents would be able to make 
an informed decision regarding the adoption and might be 
more likely to adopt knowing that they are educated about the 
fmancial and emotional risks involved in adopting the child. 347 
340. See Robert J. Baker, Gibbs v. Ernst: Pennsylvania Recognizes Negligent 
Nondisclosure In Wrongful Adoption Cases, 31 TORT & INS. L. J. 103, 109 (1995). 
341. See Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882,894 (Pa. 1994). 
342. See id. 
343. See Kelly Bennison, No Deposit No Return: The Adoption Dilemma, 16 NOVA 
L. REV. 909, 923 (1992) (noting that "the denial ofthe opportunity to make an informed 
decision is the essence of the tort of wrongful adoption"). 
344. See Dickson, supra note 18, at 964. 
345. See id. 
346. See id. 
347. See id. Dickson writes: 
This system would give adopters the means to weigh the risks in the same 
manner as biological parents yet would insulate agencies from liability except 
where they had failed to carry out their responsibilities or purposely misled 
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In addition, a duty to investigate a child's background would 
not burden adoption agencies any more than the thorough in-
vestigations of potential adoptive parents that adoption agen-
cies already undertake. 348 Often, adoption agencies develop 
methods to screen potential adoptive parents. 349 These meth-
ods include psychological and social criteria that significantly 
limit the type of people that can successfully apply for adop-
tion.350 If adoption agencies are already engaging in such thor-
ough investigations to select potential adoptive parents, they 
can clearly perform similar investigations to ensure that the 
people who survive the strict acceptance process are adequately 
able and prepared to care for a special needs child. 351 Although 
such investigations can be expensive, many states require that 
expenses, even those incurred while investigating the adoptive 
parents, are paid by the adoptive parents themselves.352 Thus, 
a reasonable investigation into a child's background would cost 
the adoption agency little, if anything at all. 353 
2. Duty to Warn 
Although the Montana Supreme Court did not address 
whether an adoption agency has a duty to warn adoptive par-
ents of a child's background, state courts should impose such a 
duty. Had the Jacksons been warned of Aaron's risk of devel-
oping a mental illness, they might have chosen not to adopt a 
special needs child, thereby avoiding severe financial and emo-
tional damages.354 As with the duty to investigate, courts have 
[d. 
adopters. Such policies would not make agencies guarantors of a child's future 
good health; rather, they would encourage candid disclosure and adequate 
assessments of children. 
348. See Dickson, supra note 18, at 954 (noting that such tests include "evaluations 
of their ability to parent, personality tests, a required medical examination, a criminal 
records check, and fingerprinting"). 
349. See id. (citing Katz, Community Decision-Makers and the Promotion of Values 
in the Adoption of Children, 4 J. FAM. L. 7, 21-22 (1964)). 
350. See Dickson, supra note 18, at 954. 
351. See id. 
352. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-129(c), which states that "the actual and reasonable 
cost of providing information pursuant to this section shall be paid by the person 
requesting the information." 
353. See Dickson, supra note 18, at 955. 
354. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 35. 
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been reluctant to hold adoption agencies liable for failing to 
warn adoptive parents of future potential health problems of 
their children. 3M However, imposition of a duty to accurately 
relay information is not a new concept in tort law and is re-
quired in many situations. 356 
For example, courts have repeatedly held that physicians 
have a duty to warn patients if they learn of dangerous side 
effects after prescribing medication.357 Courts have similarly 
held that psychotherapists have a duty to warn third parties if 
a patient threatens to kill a specific person. 358 In a remarkable 
decision in New Jersey, an appellate court held that a physi-
cian had a duty to warn his patient's daughter that she had an 
increased risk of developing cancer, concluding that "a duty to 
warn of avertible risk from genetic causes, by definition a mat-
ter of familial concern, is sufficiently narrow to serve the inter-
ests of justice."359 The court went on to say that the duty to 
warn is not only owed to the patient, but also to any of the pa-
tient's immediate family members who might suffer as a result 
of a physician's breach.360 Likewise, in the adoption context, 
the duty to warn shoUld not only be owed to the child to ensure 
his adequate care, but also to the adoptive parents who will 
inevitably suffer as a result of the adoption agency's failure to 
warn. 
355. See 2 AM. JUR, 2d Adoption § 163 (1994). 
356. See Wanda M. Temm, Out Of Sight, Out Of Mind, But Not Out Of Duty: 
Adoption Agency's Duty To Disclose Medical Information To Birth Parents Post-
Relinquishment, 63 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 359, 363 (1995). 
357. See, e.g., Tresemer v. Barke, 150 Cal. Rptr. 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (doctor's 
failure to warn of dangerous side effects of the Dalkon Shield was a negligent breach of 
duty to warn). 
358. See e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (Cal. 1976) 
(upon determination that patient presents a danger of violence to a third party, 
psychotherapist has a duty to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim). 
359. Safer v. Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). 
360. See id. The court wrote: 
. Id. 
We need not decide, in the present posture of this case, how, precisely, that 
duty is to be discharged, especially with respect to young children who may be 
at risk, except to require that reasonable steps be taken to assure that the 
information reaches those likely to be affected or is made available for their 
benefit . 
50
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol29/iss2/3
1999] ADOPTION LAW 231 
Similarly, the duty to warn has been extended in wrongful 
birth claims to physicians who failed to adequately inform par-
ents of any pregnancy risks. 361 Most courts that have heard 
wrongful birth claims have upheld their validity under the no-
tion that there is no justification for a system that deprives 
parents of the opportunity to know of the risks inherent in 
their pregnancy while at the same time forbidding them from 
recovering the cost of treating and caring for the ill child that is 
bom.362 The heart of the wrongful birth tort is the denial of a 
parent's opportunity to make an informed decision regarding 
the termination of her pregnancy.363 The heart of the wrongful 
adoption tort is the same; adoptive parents should also be al-
lowed to make intelligent decisions regarding their ability to 
care for a child whom they wish to adopt.3&! As in wrongful 
birth claims, there is no justification for a system that deprives 
potential adoptive parents of the opportunity to know of the 
risks inherent in an adoption while at the same time forbidding 
them to recover the cost of treating and caring for the ill child 
that is adopted. Had the Jacksons been warned of Aaron's risk 
of developing a mental illness, they might have chosen not to 
adopt a special needs child, thereby avoiding severe fmancial 
and emotional damages.365 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Following the decisions of other jurisdictions, the court in 
Jackson v. Montana recognized the negligence-based tort of 
wrongful adoption, fmding that both common law and Montana 
statutory law imposed a duty upon adoption agencies to accu-
rately represent and disclose information regarding a child's 
background to adoptive parents.366 First, the court held that 
forseeability and public policy interests mandated a common 
law duty upon adoption agencies to refrain from negligently 
36l. See Susan Kempf LeMay, The Emergence Of Wrongful Adoption As A Cause Of 
Action, 27 J. FAM. L. 475, 486 (1989). 
362. See id. at 487. 
363. See id. 
364. See id. 
365. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 53. 
366. See Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d 35, 48-49, 51 (Mont. 1998). 
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misrepresenting a child's background to adoptive parents.367 
Second, the court found that adoption agencies had a statutory 
duty to disclose a child's background to adoptive parents. 368 
Finally, the court held that adoptive parents can recover for 
emotional and financial damages by demonstrating that they 
would not have adopted the child had they known of his back-
ground.369 
Although the Montana Supreme Court recognized an adop-
tive parent's right to be informed of a child's background before 
committing to an adoption, it did not extend an adoption 
agency's liability far enough. Rather than address the extent 
to which an adoption agency may be held liable to adoptive 
parents under Montana's disclosure statutes, the court elected 
to rely on the State's adoption policy manual to fill in the 
gaps.370 The court was presented with the opportunity to man-
date that adoption agencies disclose all available information 
about a child's background, but chose instead to leave Mon-
tana's mjnjmum disclosure requirements intact.371 The court 
declined to impose more stringent requirements upon adoption 
agencies, including a duty to conduct a reasonable investiga-
tion into a child's background or a duty to warn adoptive par-
ents of possible illnesses to which a child might be susceptible. 
Acceptance of wrongful adoption claims has finally provided 
recourse to unwitting adoptive parents faced with having to 
care for physically and psychologically disabled children due to 
the negligence of adoption agencies. Adoptive parents are no 
longer forced to decide whether to annul the adoption or to in-
cur the substantial costs of caring for a special needs child. 
Hopefully, as more state courts accept wrongful adoption as a 
viable claim for adoptive parents, they will begin to impose 
more responsibility upon adoption agencies by increasing their 
liability to adoptive parents. Determining the extent of an 
adoption agency's future liability will become crucial as the 
367. See id. at 47-48. 
368. See id. at 51. 
369. See Jackson, 956 P.2d at 53. 
370. See id. at 50-51. 
371. See id. 
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numbers of adopted children born to drug-addicted or HIV-
positive mothers continues to increase.372 Courts must lead the 
way by imposing increased responsibility upon adoption agen-
cies. It is crucial for them to remember that an adoption 
agency's "denial of [an adoptive parent's] opportunity to make 
an informed decision is the essence of the tort of wrongful 
adoption. "373 
Jennifer Emmaneez* 
372. See Gibeaut, supra note 21, at 34. 
373. Bennison, supra note 343, at 923. For a decision after Jackson, see Wolford v. 
Children's Home Soc'y, 17 F. Supp. 2d 577 (S.D.W. Va. 1998). There, the court applied 
the wrongful adoption analysis to an agency that allegedly failed to disclose that the 
adopted child had Fetal Alcohol Syndrome. See id. In finding that the adoptive 
parents had a viable claim for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, the court 
noted its dissatisfaction with the term wrongful adoption. See id. Rather, the court 
found that the term wronged adoption better illustrated the focus on agency 
misconduct. See id. 
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